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Abstract 
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socio-legal studies or political science, this Joint Working Papers explores the cognitive equipement 
through which international judges perform their role. The notion of ‘fabric’, borrowed from the 
Science and technology studies, and Bruno Latour in particular, is used here as a common entrypoint 
enabling to consider altogether the (legal and non-legal, formal and unformal) tools and templates that 
contribute to shape international judicial decision-making: ‘best practices’, judicial compendia, 
routinized legal repertoires, legal methodologies, standard operational modes, etc… 
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 1 
Introduction 
Antoine Vauchez* 
This working paper is part of a series of research initiatives that have taken place within the 
framework of the Global Governance Program with a view to open a new research agenda on 
international courts and lawyering
1
. A first workshop had been organized on the 17
th
 and 18
th
 of May 
2011 entitled ‘A Transnational Inquiry into the Disputed Field of Global Justice: A Renewed Research 
Agenda’. Its main focus had been on the role of transnational legal entrepreneurs and networks in line 
with a number of recently published research, particularly in the field of European law
2
. A second 
Workshop took place on the 15
th
 and 16
th
 of March 2012 with the intent to complement such actor-
centered approach with an exploration of the more institutionalized façade of courts, that is of the 
cognitive and material frames that constitute a court’s idiosyncratic ‘judicial style’.  
Strangely enough, indeed, we still think too often about international jurisprudence as the outcome 
of a free deliberation among individual judges, regardless of the highly institutionalized setting in 
which they are delivering justice
3
. For a variety of reasons: political scientists rarely dare ‘entering’ 
the court’s universe, most often studying judicial decision-making from the outside; legal scholars 
have oft kept their focus essentially on legal categories, therefore remaining quite oblivious of the 
many non-legal forms with which judging is performed. As a result, elements such as internal 
organizational standards, legal compendia, keywords indexes, computer softwares, etc… are often 
considered unimportant and, as such, have remained unexplored. The objective of the Workshop was 
precisely to widen our perspective in this regard mixing legal theory, organizational sociology, socio-
legal studies and political science. To this aim, the participants all accepted to work with the notion of 
‘fabric’, borrowed from the Science and technology studies, and Bruno Latour in particular, as a way 
to seize altogether the (legal and non-legal, formal and unformal) tools and templates that shape 
judicial decision-making. By this, we do not mean to indicate that judges (international or not) are 
caught in a sort Weberian judicial ‘iron cage’ progressively losing their margins of maneuvering under 
the pressure of an overall rationalization process. Rather, we would like to suggest that judicial 
decision-making does not happen on a tabula rasa. Each court has its own set of instruments and 
techniques with which judges perform their office: standard operational modes, established arguments, 
routinized legal grammars, standardized references to precedents, translation devices or even 
computers’ software, etc… Studying these forms and templates sheds a new light on how international 
judging is generated.  
The value of such research line is also to offer a common ground for interdisciplinary research 
putting together legal scholars interested in studying the ‘grammar’ or ‘repertoire’ of international / 
                                                     
*
 Research Professor at the Centre européen de sociologie et science politique (CNRS, Université Paris 1-Sorbonne) and at 
the Global Governance Program. I am grateful to Cristina Dallara for having helped me at various moments of this 
project. I would also like to thank Bruno de Witte, Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, Miguel Maduro, Frédéric Mégret and 
Alec Stone for their insights and comments during the workshop. 
1
 See also the corresponding High Level Policy Seminar organized by Adriana Dreyzin, Miguel Maduro, Antoine Vauchez 
(eds.), Courts, Social Change and Judicial Independence, Working Paper series, RSCAS PP 2012/07.  
2
 Cf. the various volumes or symposia edited by members of the Polilexes research group: Cohen, A. and Vauchez, A. 
(eds) ‘Law, Lawyers, Transnational Politics and the Production of Europe’ (2007) Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 32, No 1, 
75-82 ; Mbongo, P. and Vauchez, A. (eds) Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de 
justice des Communautés européennes (Brussels, Bruylant, 2009) ; Christoffersen, J. and Madsen, M. (eds), The 
European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) ; and, last but not 
least, see de Witte, B. and Vauchez, A. (eds) Lawyering Europe. European Law as a Social Field (Oxford, Hart 
publishing, 2012, to be published). 
3
 But see Alec Stone who has interesting pages on judicial path dependency: cf. Stone, A. The Judicial Construction of 
Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 30-41.  
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European law, on the one hand, and sociologists careful about how “courts” exist through a number of 
institutions, roles and codes, on the other. While the latter may actually further their understanding of 
the bricks, methods and templates with which international case-law is been produced, the former may 
get additional purchase as to how coordination emerges among judges who most often come from a 
wide diversity of national and professional backgrounds.Such research programme is still exploratory 
and, at this stage, the papers cover essentially European courts. While this is certainly a limit to the 
scope of these analyses
4
, one should however point at the leading role European courts have acquired 
over the past decades in the field of international/regional justice as the ‘success stories’ to be 
followed
5
. 
This Joint Working paper is divided in two parts. The first part considers “Actors and Know-how”. 
Antoine Vauchez questions the heuristic potential of a number of central political science concepts 
such as ‘legal entrepreneurship’, ‘transnational esprit de corps’, ‘social legitimacy’ when applied to 
the study of the European Court of Justice; Iyiola Solanke empirically explores in particular the role of 
ECJ référendaires in the circulation of information, ideas and arguments within the Court; and 
Cristina Dallara inquires into the Council of Europe tracing the formation of judicial ‘best practices’ in 
the Venice Commission. The second part of the Working paper, entitled ‘Methods and Tools’, 
considers how European courts have tailor ad hoc interpretative tools, methods and key concepts, 
thereby progressively constituting their own specific ‘judicial style’. Bilyana Petkova compares the 
operational modes with which the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 
deal with diversity among Member States; Jérome Porta analyses the translation methodology of the 
CJUE; and Bastiaan van Bockel shows how a specifically European understanding of ‘ne bis in idem’ 
principle emerged in the Court’s case-law. 
 
                                                     
4
 For a research programme covering all international courts, see the recently open research center at the University of 
Copenhagen: http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/. 
5
 Cf. Karen Alter, ‘The Global Spread of European Style International Courts’, West European Politics, Vol. 35, No 1, 
2012, 135-154. 
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The European Themis and its Social Fabric 
Review, Reflections and New Directions for Studies of the European Court of Justice 
Antoine Vauchez* 
There is nowadays a general agreement among EU studies’ scholars to consider that the Court of 
Luxembourg played a critical role in market and political integration
1
. Political scientists have 
extensively exemplified its decisive influence in pushing EU polity way beyond what Member States 
have been prepared to (Europeanization), while legal scholars have shown in great details how the 
Court contributed to gradually transform EU treaties into one constitutional charter of Europe 
(Constitutionalization). As a result of such vibrant streams of research, it is hardly possible to think of 
“Europe” without considering the role of its judicial branch. And yet, after decades of intensive 
research, the ECJ remains surprisingly unknown. While EU studies routinely scrutinize every single 
move of the European Commission and describes extensively its many internal divisions and 
administrative cultures, scholars have remained so far strikingly silent about the judicial branch of EU 
government: even though the Court’s verdicts are scrutinized in specialized journals and conferences, 
the institution itself, its specific ‘judicial style’, its distinct internal cleavages, its professional roles and 
models of excellency, the concrete persons whose task it is to manipulate and interpret EC law have 
remained in large part unexplored
2
. All in all, while scholarly writing has extensively dealt with the 
role of law in EU integration, it has remained strikingly oblivious of the Court itself. The reason for 
such state of academic affairs partly lies in the lenses that have been used so far when looking at the 
plateau de Kirchberg in Luxembourg. Both mainstream law and political science approaches to the 
ECJ have indeed converged in viewing the Court in an anthropomorphic manner as if it was one 
unitary actor granted with intentions and acting in a strategic manner
3
. While law professors assess the 
underlying legal rationality of the Court’s case-law, and political scientists consider its strategies in 
pursuing pre-existing interests (prestige, independence, etc…) in front of a variety of constraints and 
interlocutors, both parts view the ECJ as one reified collective. Here is not the place to detail how 
heuristic such approach may have proved
4
, in particular in pointing out the salient position acquired by 
the Court throughout the course of European integration. Yet, most often than not, “the Court” is 
therefore taken as a sort of a-historical “given”, independent from the contexts in which it operates and 
the actors that populates it
5
. Research-wise, such convergence of legal positivism and political science 
                                                     
*
 Research Professor at the Centre européen de sociologie et science politique (CNRS, Université Paris 1-Sorbonne) and at 
the Global Governance Program. 
1
 For recent reviews, see Conant, L. (2007) ‘Review Article. The Politics of European Legal Integration’. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 45-66 ; Stone, A. (2010) The European Court of Justice and the 
Judicialization of EU Governance, http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/ ;  
2
 There are few well-known exceptions: Schepel, H. and Wesserling, R. ‘The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, 
Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe’ (1997) European Law Journal, Vol. 3, No2, 165-188 ; see Kenney, S. 
‘The Members of the Court of the European Communities’ (1998-99) Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 5, No 1, 
101-133 ; and the various volumes or symposia edited by members of the Polilexes research group: Cohen, A. and 
Vauchez, A. (eds) ‘Law, Lawyers, Transnational Politics and the Production of Europe’ (2007) Law and Social Inquiry, 
Vol. 32, No 1, 75-82 ; Mbongo, P. and Vauchez, A. (eds) Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics 
de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes (Brussels, Bruylant, 2009) ; Christoffersen, J. and Madsen, M. 
(eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) ; and, 
last but not least, see de Witte, B. and Vauchez, A. (eds) Lawyering Europe. European Law as a Social Field (Oxford, 
Hart publishing, 2012, to be published). 
3
 For a critique of such rationalism, see Andreas Grimmel (2012) ‘Judicial Interpretation of Judicial Activism: The Legacy 
of Rationalism in the Studies of the European Court of Justice’, European Law Journal, 18 (4), pp. 518-535. 
4
 The central reference here is Stone, A. (2004) The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
5
 But see Kenney, S. (1998-99) ‘The Members of the Court of the European Communities’, Columbia Journal of European 
Law. Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 101-133, and, more recently, Cohen, A. ‘Ten Majestic Figures in Long Amaranth Robes’. The 
Formation of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ in de Witte, B. and Vauchez, A. (eds) Lawyering 
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rationalism means that there has been so far little, if any, empirical interest in opening the Court’s 
black-box. As a result, most studies provide a disembodied narrative of legalization or 
constitutionalization processes with the Court standing as a foreseeing actor pursuing abstract goals 
and institutional interests
6
. Because of the blindspots these disciplinary perspectives actually share, 
they are now producing decreasing outputs. One first reason simply lies in the fact that such 
representation of a disincarnated and a-historical Court consistently maximizing its interests lacks 
realism. Do we seriously think that what we refer to as “the Court” in 1952, when it was composed of 
9 members and 30 employees dealing with a sectoral policy (coal and steal) is in any sort of way 
similar to what we refer to as “the Court” in 2010, that is the complex organization made of 67 judges, 
3 jurisdictions, 27 nationalities, 200 law clerks, 1000 employees? Similarly: can we assume “the 
Court” acts in a similar fashion when it is issuing verdict in the context of a semi-public EU polity 
hardly raising any interest among national social and political actors, and when its rulings are put 
under continuous scrutiny by a diverse set of interest groups, multinational companies, Member States, 
Ngos, etc… The primarily goal of the social fabric approach consists in providing a more 
comprehensive and historically accurate account of the processes through which the European Court 
of Justice (its institutional identity, its jurisprudence) has been formed and transformed over the past 
decades. Yet, it is not just a matter of “knowing more” or accumulating details, needless to say 
gossips, on the nitty-gritty of ECJ circles… It is not even a matter of unveiling a hidden secret on the 
“true” motivations that the Court would have kept secret in “fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg”7. More 
importantly, such research path allows to answer some of the key questions regarding the Court that 
legal positivists and political science rationalists have left unaddressed as they were not equipped to 
raise them. Among them: i) how does legal change (in particular, new jurisprudential developments) 
happen in a Court that neo-institutionalists describe as taken into a path-dependent whirl?; ii) how 
does such a complex and heterogeneous institution with so little control over the recruitment of its 
members actually manages to keep its integrationist jurisprudence constant over time?; iii) how does 
the Court secure its legitimacy in EU polity in a context where its decisions are scrutinized and often 
criticized by an increasing variety of social and political actors?  
In order to address such research puzzles, there is a need to break open a renewed conceptual and 
empirical tool-kit better equipped to go track the social fabric of “the Court”. Drawing from deep-
seated acquis from the field of political sociology and sociology of professions, the overall claim of 
this paper is that researchers now need to unpack “the Court” and consider the social mechanisms that 
structure it. To put it differently, “the Court” is not simply a source of explanation, it is simultaneously 
a ‘result’ of a variety of social processes. To this aim, one needs to look at Courts in a different 
manner: courts, it is argued hereafter, are not free-floating entities with abstract interests, nor do they 
hold by themselves or survive merely by routine or self-perpetuation. Just like there is no artist 
without the “network of cooperation” that make up the “art world” famously studied by Howard 
Becker
8, there is no jurisdiction without a “world” of professionals that has historically emerged and 
solidified (judges, their law clerks, private legal practitioners, law professors
9
); and a related set of 
shared beliefs and commonly-agreed upon legal principles. In other words, Courts are not just formal 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Europe. European Law as a Social Field, op. cit.; and Cohen, A. and Vauchez A. (2011) ‘The Social Construction of 
Law: The European Court of Justice and Its Legal Revolution Revisited’, Annual Review and Law and Social Sciences, 
vol. 7, 2011, pp. 417-432. 
6
 But see de Búrca, G. (2005) ‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, 
No 2, 310-36; and Shaw, J. (2003) ‘The European Union: Discipline Building Meets Polity Building’, in Cane, P. and 
Tushnet, M. (eds) Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 325-352.  
7
 Stein, E. (1981) ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’. American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 75, No. 1, 1-27. 
8
 Becker, H. (1982) The Art Worlds (Berkeley, University of California Press). 
9
 Shapiro, M. (2002) ‘The Success of Judicial Review and Democracy’, in Stone, A. and Shapiro, M. (eds), On Law, 
Politics and Judicialization (Oxford, Oxford University Press) 159-183, at 181. 
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institutions whose nature is defined in the black letter of the treaties, but they are at one and the same 
time a social setting (a specific constellation of actors) and a system of meaning (norms and 
worldviews). Such “social world” is a site of contention where a number of legal professionals, but 
also a variety of EU-implicated actors contend over the definition of the nature and future of the Court, 
including the most convenient direction for its jurisprudence, the most relevant type of know-how and 
credentials to persuasively perform EU judicial office, the priorities for its future organizational 
reforms, etc… In other words, the social fabric approach does not take “the Court” -its “interests”, 
“mandates”, or “institutional design”- as the premise and starting point of the analysis; rather it takes 
the social process through which they are produced and re-produced as the core of the inquiry itself. 
With such perspective, the focus is not so much on the interaction between “the Court” taken as one 
entity and its interlocutors (national courts, Member States, EU institutions, etc…), but rather on the 
variety of social processes that cut across institutional lines with concrete and living actors connected 
in a variety of ways within and outside the Court
10
: how are the norms about appropriate conduct as a 
member of the Court defined? how does the Court concretely manage its increasing heterogeneity? 
How do new comers are turned into ‘believers’ or, at least, ‘perpetuators’ of the Court’s legal 
tradition?, etc… Such research path compels the researcher to find new methodological tools. In 
particular, the extensive recourse to large-N statistical analyses of the Court that has dominated the 
political science literature during the last decades now produces contradictory results. It should be 
complemented with a new research strategy based on fine-grained qualitative inquiries through which 
the researcher would step into in the Court, look from close-up at the variety of actors, groups and 
strategies that populate it. In carrying such research program, the researcher has to confront with the 
fact that the Court has remained reluctant to provide with information not only on the judicial 
documentation of the cases (non-publication of the report for the hearing and limited access to 
pleadings, etc…), but also more simply on its inner functioning. Most European courts share such 
sense of discretion and secrecy although some recent unexpected examples should be mentioned
11
. 
Yet, such tendency is particularly acute in Luxembourg not only for the well-known fact that there are 
no dissenting opinions, but more generally for the non-disclosure of institutional archives
12
. The paper 
however explores various ways of circumventing such empirical difficulty: gathering judges and law 
clerks biographical data, considering each judge’s personal entrepreneurship with the realm of EC law 
doctrine, looking at the various commemorative venues from eulogies to Festschriften or jubilees, 
etc... 
In the remainder of this article, I suggest to open the conceptual and analytical toolbox to three 
classic concepts of political sociology –Entrepreneurship, Esprit de corps and Legitimacy- only rarely 
used when studying the European Court of Justice. In the following sections, I consider the added 
value and empirical potential of each of these three tools.  
I. Accounting for Legal Change: the Politics of Judicial Entrepreneurship  
As a result of the here above mentioned anthromorphic bias in studying the Court, judges’ agency and 
agenda has been essentially written out from most accounts of the constitutionalization narrative. My 
overall contention is that introducing the notion of judicial entrepreneurship, here defined as the 
                                                     
10
 Vauchez, A. (2008) ‘The Force of a Weak Field. Law, Lawyers, and the Production of EU Government’, International 
Political Sociology, Vol. 3, No 1, 124-148. 
11
 See the case of the French Conseil d’Etat which opened its deliberations to a prominent French sociologist Bruno Latour: 
see Latour, B. (2009) The Making of Law. An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (New York: Polity Press) ; see also the 
opening of the archives of the French Conseil constitutionnel up to 1982, including its deliberations (bill n°2008-695 of 
the 15th July 2008 concerning the Archives of the Conseil). 
12
 A legal framework for such disclosure actually exists since a February 1983 Regulation (n°354/83) and a December 1984 
Contract foreseeing the depositing of the Court’s archives to the Historical Archives of the European Communities (see 
http://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU).  
Antoine Vauchez 
 
8 
 
innovative investment of one or more judges in the intellectual contests over the definition of the 
nature and future of EU legal order
13
, allows for a revised version of the the constitutionalization of 
Europe thanks to a more refined understanding of the politics of legal change. Granted, there is a 
traditional reluctance to consider judges, and in particular ECJ judges, as “entrepreneurs”. Since 
Courts are supposed to be purely reactive institutions driven by legal principles, the innovative part of 
legal interpretation as well as its “disequilibrating force” (Schumpeter) are often underestimated, if not 
entirely omitted
14
. It is well known the legal milieu values references to the “legal tradition” and tends 
to frame judicial decisions within the boundaries of precedents (be they called stare decisis or 
jurisprudence constante, depending on the specifics of one’s national legal culture). Yet, judges can 
be entrepreneurs too. They certainly constitute a very specific blend of entrepreneurs, profoundly 
different from the political or business ones. In a professional realm –that of law- best defined as a 
‘static market’15, judicial entrepreneurs are bound by many shared yet oft unspoken norms as to how 
one ought to promote new legal ideas. For instance, it could easily be argued than the most successful 
entrepreneurs in the realm of law are the ones who manage to prove that their interpretative take is the 
least innovative and the most faithful to the “legal tradition”. Still, the notion proves particularly 
useful. Its added value lies in the fact that it helps overcome the traditional impasse of the activist vs. 
restrainist problématique which ultimately always implies a normative background concerning where 
the border between “judge-like” and “unjudge like” attitudes should be drawn. Rather, it considers in 
an agnostic manner what judges actually do and how they do it.  
Such an approach implies to take into account the variety of assets that prove critical in order to 
successfully promote new conceptions of law. No one would deny that legal skills and in particular the 
practical mastery of EU law’s technicalities and repertoire of justification are critical elements. 
Judicial virtuosity, that is the ability to produce new and convincing legal combinations within the 
realm of EU law is certainly critical in peddling new legal ideas. In order to frame one given legal 
claim authoritatively before or within the ECJ, one needs to draw from a limited set of previously 
established legal sentences that form the commonly-accepted bricks of EU law reasoning
16
. Walter 
van Gerven does not say otherwise when explaining how he “convinced the Court to overrule its 
earlier judgment” (the Comitology decision): “the A. G. (as I then was) used another line of reasoning, 
namely that the distribution of competences between the institutions is not only a matter of 
institutional balance but that it has also a protection of legal rights dimension (…) The Court followed 
that reasoning. The distinction may seem to be a thin distinct but it is not”17. Even though legal 
arguments matter, judges are not purely legal animals and their extra-legal skills are equally critical in 
successfully pursuing specific legal agendas. When it comes to convincing its peers, a lot of judge’s 
valued skills are not based on pure technical legal knowledge. They involve an important dose of 
craftsmanship (organizational know-how, wisdom about personal relations, “inside” knowledge about 
the Court, etc…). Such insider’s know-how refers to judges’ “practical sense” of the judicial game, 
defined by Pierre Bourdieu as the pre-reflexive ability to do things the way they are expected to be 
done and to anticipate peers’ reactions (colleagues at the Court, but also legal academics and legal 
                                                     
13
 McIntosh, W., Kates, C. (1997) Judicial Entrepreneurship. The Role of Judges in the Marketplace of Ideas (Westport: 
Greeewood Press). 
14
 But see the various narratives of ECJ case-law changes put together in Azoulai, L., Maduro, M. (eds) (2010), 
Introduction to The Past and Future of EU Law The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome 
Treaty (London: Hart Publishing). 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 On the ECJ ‘judicial style’, see Azoulai, L. (2009) ‘La Fabrication de la Jurisprudence Communautaire’, in Mbongo, P. 
and Vauchez, A. (eds), Dans la Fabrique du Droit Européen (Brussels, Bruylant) ; Bengoetxea, J. (1993) The Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press). 
17
 Van Gerven, W. (2008), ‘Politics, Ethics & the Law. Legal practice & Scholarship’, LSE working papers, Department of 
Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, London. 
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practitioners)
18
. In an interesting inquiry based on interviews with ECJ advocate generals, Iyiola 
Solanké has documented such shared albeit unspoken norms of what constitute a worthy legal 
argumentation. It includes drafting skills, clarity of the style, ability to keep a distance from ordinary 
legal scholarship, but also -one could add- self-restraint, mediating abilities, swiftness in designing 
alternative wording, etc
19… In addition to this practical sense, one should consider also the various 
channels of mobilization through which judges actually ‘campaign’20. To be sure, judicial 
entrepreneurs certainly never openly publicize their undertaking, nor would they march or rally to 
promote them ! They rather disseminate their legal ideas through more discrete channels within the 
realm of the legal community: opinion-writing
21
, legal scholarship
22, speeches in academic or bar’s 
conferences
23
, commemorations and Festschriften
24, etc…  
Inserting such living, acting and purposeful people into the study of the ECJ is not just a matter of 
knowing more about its general “context” or “background” and bringing a more colourful picture of 
the Court. I argue it provides with a sociological explanation for how specific interpretations of EU 
treaties made their way to the European Court of Justice and how they eventually managed (or not) to 
solidify into the Court’s jurisprudence. I have analysed in such manner how the Van Gend en Loos 
decision granting direct effect to article 12 of the Rome treaties (standstill) has been gradually 
transformed into a lasting jurisprudence providing the key to interpret not only the entire Rome 
treaties but, more generally, EU legal order
25
. Contrarily to what is ritually indicated in many EC law 
textbooks, such constitutional doctrine did not just come out of the Court ex nihilo as one full-fledged 
doctrine by the mere fact of having granted to a Dutch transportation firm (Van Gend en Loos 
Algemeine) a right to freely export its goods across borders. It has been crafted, tested, refined and 
eventually solidified by a number of legal entrepreneurs within and outside the Court, before and after 
the verdict. Judges such as Robert Lecourt or Antonio Trabucchi, law clerks such as Roger-Michel 
Chevallier and Paolo Gori literally started a mobilization campaign in their academic writing, 
lawyering, judging, etc… in order to progressively extend the scope of the decision into one judicial 
theory of Europe profoundly different from the traditional conception of international treaties. They 
toured the conferences of the emerging community of Euro-lawyers (FIDE Congress in The Hague, 
April 1963; Cologne Conference, October 1963, etc…) peddling such new conceptions of 
international law in the European marketplace legal ideas. Such bold “legal revolution” gradually 
gained social credit thanks to these judges’ multiple positioning which allowed them to reach out a 
variety of a (national and European) bureaucratic, academic, judicial, and political fora. In other 
words, I argue that the brokering capacities of these judicial entrepreneurs have been key to the 
successful transformation of their new “legal products” from mere trial balloons and floating ideas into 
consolidated jurisprudence. All in all, the Van Gend en Loos doctrine is the product of an 
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uninterrupted flow of ECJ decisions, academic studies, pan-European mobilizations to which these 
judicial entrepreneurs have taken part very actively. 
II. Explaining Judicial Consistency: the Making of a Transnational Esprit de corps  
Few studies actually take the consistency of the Court’s jurisprudence over time and across policy 
domains as a research puzzle. Yet, it is quite safe to hypothesize that, in absence of a supranational 
judicial professional able to train and instill core values and beliefs to the incoming judges, the Court’s 
members would not spontaneously converge on what actually is in the Court’s “best interest” or on 
how its prestige and independence is best promoted. In particular, the dominant rationalist explanatory 
framework fails to account for why the European Court of Justice has maintained and even pushed 
further its constitutional and pan-European jurisprudence in a number of groundbreaking decisions –
from Kadi to Laval and Viking- while at the same time nearly doubling the number of its members 
following the last waves of EU enlargement
26
. Neo-institutionnalists do offer some plausible 
explanation by pointing at the particular relevance of path dependent mechanisms in the realm of 
judicial decision-making. Alec Stone has authored important pages on the development of precedent-
based practices in the case of the ECJ with Van Gend en Loos (1963) standing as the critical juncture 
and the EU litigation arena being the site of a long-term self-reinforcing process
27
. However, the fact 
that EC lawyers do not work in an unpredictable and chaotic manner is not enough an explanation 
when it comes to understanding why and how “the Court” has maintained and repeatedly revived its 
pro-integrationnist agenda over time. By insisting essentially on the endogeneous dynamics of EC 
judicial decision-making, this neo-institutionnalist account therefore over-estimates the inherent 
stability of institutions themselves. Institutions and professional roles do not hold by themselves, nor 
have a life of their own, unless their underlying creeds and credos are perpetuated and revitalized 
through continuous social and political mobilizations. This is particularly true in the case of a Court, 
the ECJ, whose social world has changed so drastically over the decades, moving away from the 
small, stable and cohesive milieu that had coalesced in the mid-1960s with ECJ founding decisions
28
. 
Ever since the departure of a small group of judges and référendaires who had been closely linked 
with the consolidation of the “Van Gend en Loos-Costa doctrine”29, such stability gave way to an 
increasingly mobile and diverse community of practitioners. Over the years, the European Court of 
Justice has experienced an on-going process of internal differentiation that has transformed it into a 
complex organization made up of a number of institutions (the Court of Justice, the Court of First 
Instance created in 1991 and the Civil Service Tribunal), judges (from a group of 13 from 9 Member 
States in the mid-1970s to a group of 70 from 27 Member States today), associations (the Amicale des 
référendaires et anciens référendaires created in 1991, the permanent delegation to the Court of 
Justice of the Council of European Bar associations and Law societies, etc…), and specialized 
professional groups
30
. Such transformation came along with an increasing turn-over: while there was 
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only two judges leaving the ECJ every three years during the 1950s-70s period, the average rate of 
departure rose to two per year in the 1980s and 1990s, and to more than three per year in the past 
decade. Such instability was made even more obvious by the fact that référendaires, which until then 
had been regarded as the permanent figures of the institution, not only grew in number up to a group 
of more than 200 members
31
 but also lost its stability as their time in office drastically fell down to 
five years on average in the late 1990
32
. 
Starting from such premise that indicates the precariousness of the Court’s setting, a “social fabric 
approach” questions the mechanisms allowing for the maintenance of the “Van Gen en Loos-Costa 
doctrine”, in particular the socialization devices where new comers (judges, law clerks) are been 
inculcated such core beliefs and basic legal principles. As there is no judicial profession where ECJ 
judges could be trained and selected, one needs to look at how role transmission operates in 
Luxembourg. Just like for any institution, informal meetings and debates in the corridors and at the 
canteen certainly constitute an essential form of internal socialization. In particular, the sociability of 
référendaires across cabinets could be studied in such perspective as it is home to discussions over 
ongoing judgments and, more importantly, to a general mainstreaming of the cognitive and normative 
frames used to evaluate legal issues and individual moves
33
. Formal instruments –such as internal legal 
databases or Judicial Compendia- are another essential socialization device. As they include routinized 
legal formulas, key words, and bureaucratic forms that have been codified over the decades, they are 
certainly also decisive in channeling the new comers’ initiatives in the set of previously established 
legal alternatives and debates. The systematic codification of ECJ “judicial style” provided by the then 
ECJ judge Pierre Pescatore (diffused in the Court in the early 1980s and only recently made public)
34
 
gives an idea of the rich potential of such research line
35
. Yet, given the difficult access to information 
at the Court of Luxembourg, these research paths are difficult to engage. There is however another 
covert and so far neglected venue which allows ECJ judges’ to gather: commemorations, be they 
Festschriften, tributes, eulogies or Courts’ jubilees36. I have argued that these celebrations, even 
though they have been so far neglected, are not just a mere legitimatory device. One element should 
lead us to think otherwise: while eulogies and Festschriften are of almost no legal value (the latter are 
best described as “graveyards of scholarship”37) and involve a whole economy of efforts and 
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investments, there is a general willingness to participate. By their regularity, publicity, and the great 
deal of attention that is given to the formal respect of the ceremonial rules
38
, I argue they typically 
constitute an institutional ritual: praising the timeless ideas of the Court is an essential technology for 
handling temporal issues such as heterogeneity and conflict. As a matter of fact, these commemorative 
rituals all converge in displaying the unity of ECJ judicial community united around the Court’s 
founding decisions and core legal principles. We are reminded of the “atmosphere of collegiality, one 
might even say of brotherhood – since, unfortunately, we (the Court) have only had had one sister”39 
and of “the link that unites us in the memory and the recognition of our great colleague and 
unforgettable friend”40. Such recurrence of the metaphor of the Court as a “family” and/or as a 
“community” to which (past, current and would-be) judges are incited to identify, helps revive a 
transversal solidarity transcending the potential national, professional or ideological divisions among 
the various judges. United despite their diversity, they are called upon to recognize each other as 
insiders of the Court whose task is to maintain and promote the lasting lessons of the “revolutionary 
years”. Moreover, as it has been extensively exemplified by the sociology of institutional rituals, these 
do not only maintain a sense of belonging to a “community”, they simultaneously contribute to stratify 
it. As famously shown by Marcel Mauss
41
, the position occupied during the ceremony (whether one is 
member of the honorary committee, co-editor, contributor, reader, etc…) is critical to defining one’s 
position in the institution praised: “founding fathers” authoritatively embodying the Court’s “eternal 
yesterday”, current spokesmen in charge of leading the Court in the present, and (putative) 
“inheritors”, most of the time the former référendaires of the departing judge, who are called upon to 
inherit from such legacy. All in all, studying these commemorations as rituals allows to seize the 
symbolic and social processes through which the Court’s ideals are maintained, in particular the 
socialization devices that help revive and transmit its core beliefs and legal principles.  
III. Securing Legitimacy: the Court’s Publics and Audiences 
The last analytical concept I would like to add to the “social fabric” tool-kit is the notion of 
legitimacy. As it stands in opposition to the formal study of legality, such notion has been the 
founding concept of political science as far as the study of institutions is concerned. In its most classic 
weberian meaning, it points at the social acceptance / recognition by a select number of groups and 
audiences of one given claim for power
42
. In the case of the Court, such claim brings us back once 
again to the revolutionary years of 1963-1964 when the emerging community of Euro-lawyers defined 
the Court’s nature (constitutional court) and functionality (an essential lever for integration). The 
recognition of such claim depends on the support it is able to secure outside of the Court itself, among 
legal and non-legal actors. Without a support from external audiences, the Court’s legal constructions 
would remain, as indicated by former ECJ president Andreas Donner himself, “une variation de la 
vieille histoire du baron de Münchhausen qui sortait de la boue en se tirant par ses propres cheveux”43. 
Here is not the place to trace the complex history through which national legal elites, and in particular, 
national Supreme Courts, partially and gradually accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. There is now a 
whole literature documenting in great details the many transnational judicial controversies that came 
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along with the emergence of the European Court of Justice
44
. What is more intriguing is how the 
legitimacy of the Court is secured outside of the legal realm
45
. To this aim, one should consider the 
dramatic change in the social and political context in which the Court delivers its decisions: the Court 
does no longer work in front of a semi-public audience of Euro-lawyers such as the Fédération 
internationale pour le droit européen (FIDE) or the few EC-implicated journals. With the expansion 
of Europe’s competences, it operates in front of a fragmented and oft conflictual European public 
sphere where a whole range of non-legal actors (economists
46
, trade unionists, Ngos
47
, lobbyists, EU-
specialized magazines and think tanks, etc…) scrutinize and question the soundness of its decisions. 
Such enlargement of the Court’s audiences implies that it is now criticized or praised from a variety of 
point of view and rationales: economists (assessing its economic rationality), Eurosceptics 
(denouncing pan-European judicial activism), left-wing parties and unions (criticizing a neo-liberal 
bias), Ngos (considering the judicial advancement of their cause), etc… As a result, the legitimacy of 
the Court’s decisions is far from granted: op-eds, trade unions’ mobilizations, think tanks’ policy 
papers, and political gatherings now regularly put it into question. Truly enough, ever since the 
creation of the Court, member states have often harshly criticized its decisions, in particular after they 
had been defeated before her. This certainly is the unavoidable side-effect of the mere fact of 
adjudicating. It seems however that the recent waves of criticisms following decisions over the 
sensitive issue of social rights present some degree of novelty. Several indicators indeed suggest a 
growing transnational suspicion now also coming from traditionally pro-integration factions
48
. 
Besides, the general trend of politicization of EU issues puts non-majoritarian institutions such as the 
European Central Bank or the European Court of Justice at risk: their essentially legal/technical form 
of legitimacy are questioned when it comes to judge in highly political or divisive matters.  
All in all, these sketchy remarks are an invitation for new inter-disciplinary encounters between 
« the Court » and social sciences. Such encounters could be mutually beneficial if they provide ECJ 
professionals (including legal practitioners, référendaires, etc…) with more reflexivity on their own 
practices on the one hand, and political scientists with a deeper understanding of the ‘world’ lawyers 
live in on the other hand. 
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The Advocate General and the Practices of International Jurisprudence 
Iyiola Solanke* 
This paper focuses on the Advocate General (AG) in the European Court of Justice. It discusses the 
role of the AG as an innovative practice of international jurisprudence and the working practices of the 
AG to create a coherent fabric of international jurisprudence. These working practices include a search 
for information; the evaluation of information and crystallisation in the Opinion. The contribution of 
the référendaire in this process is highlighted. 
I. The AG: a ‘Needle’ of International Jurisprudence 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome entrenched the role of Advocate General in the European Court of 
Justice. From two in 1957, the number of these officers in the main European Union court – the Court 
of Justice (CJ) – has grown to eight and recent reform to the Lisbon Treaty now allows for further 
growth. The increase in numbers has moved in tandem with enlargement of the EU: it is less clear why 
five large older member states have permanent AG seats yet – when Croatia becomes a full member – 
25 member states will have to share 3 AG seats on a rotating basis. Only one of the 10 newly-acceding 
member states made this a public issue in 2004 – Poland argued (unsuccessfully) for its own 
permanent AG. This may have been for substantive reasons – the AG is seen to be of influence in the 
CJ – or pure political posturing.  
Article 252 TFEU states that 
‘The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall be ‘assisted by eight Advocates 
General...  
‘These Advocates General have the duty to act with ‘complete impartiality and independence’ in 
making ‘in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which ....require his involvement.’  
Article 253 TFEU adds the terms of appointment:  
Advocates General shall be ‘appointed by common accord of the governments of the member 
states for a term of six years.’  
These provisions are somewhat vague and have allowed the AG to devise the scope of their role in the 
CJ and EU law. The original model may have been the French commissaire du gouvernement, but the 
AG remains a hybrid legal officer performing a multi-faceted function in the CJ. The absence of this 
precise role in the legal systems of the member states has facilitated a flexible interpretation. 
Combined with the ambiguity of the Treaty, this has allowed the occupants of this role to take an 
individual approach to their duty to ‘assist’ the Court. Hence some use their Opinion to clarify whilst 
others go further to act as legal entrepreneurs. The AG has thus developed into a unique role in the 
development of international jurisprudence. Her Opinion is the key instrument by which her 
contribution is made to EU law. Whilst judges are under no obligation to follow the recommendation 
of the Advocates-General, she is said to be able to 'decisively influence the thinking of the judges.' 
AGs are described as privileged discussants with the Court. It remains to be seen whether the new 
obligation upon the Court in Article 13 TEU to ‘serve the interests’ of the EU citizen has any impact 
upon the way in which the AG provides such assistance.  
It is interesting to consider why the AGs are influential upon the judges. It could be expected that 
the relationship be less than constructive: the AGs are mandated by the Treaty to ‘assist’ the court, yet 
the judges have no say in who these assistants are or the nature of the assistance. AGs are nominated 
by the member state government, and appointed by the Council of Ministers; they are of equal formal 
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status to the judge and determines the scope of the opinion independently. The judges cannot hire or 
fire, direct or determine the manner or scope of the AG enquiry. The closed nature of judicial 
decisions makes it difficult to determine exactly how the AG ‘assists’ - what do they do that the judges 
cannot do for themselves that makes them valued members of the Court? Why does this relationship 
work? Arguably, this relationship works because the judges find value in the Advocate General 
Opinion to the jurisprudence of the Court. The AG can be described as being ‘embedded’ within, but 
operating independently of, a multi-level complex of communities including judges at the EU and 
national level, as well as legal academics, lawyers and even non-governmental organisations. This 
double-embeddedness - both within the EU judiciary and within non-judicial communities – identifies 
their practice and contribution to the fabric of international law. The Opinion is produced by 
interaction with various ‘communities’ surrounding the AG. It can be understood as legal in form but a 
product of broader social and political interaction. Figure 1 depicts this embeddedness. In his 
comparative study of judiciaries in Europe
1
, Bell locates the judicial community as a group within the 
larger legal community which is composed of lawyers and academics. This legal community is not 
only the ‘primary cognate audience’ for judges, but also partly the source of their authority, status and 
function. The legal community in turn is surrounded by the wider community of politicians, civil 
society and public opinion. The use of non-professional judiciary (lay judges), he argues ‘offers an 
element of popular participation as a corrective to a formal legal rationality.’ These lay judges act as a 
bridge between the legal community and the wider community. This model can be adapted to depict 
the composition of the EU judiciary and the location of the AG. The EU judiciary is made up of the 
members of the ECJ (27 judges, 8 AGs), the members of the CFI (27 judges) and the members of the 
Civil Service Tribunal (7 judges). The AG is mandated by the Treaty of Rome to assist ECJ judges 
only, although their Opinions are no doubt read by judges in the other two courts. Although full 
members of the ECJ, the AGs form a subset of ‘non-decisional’ judges within that court. The two 
groups of judges have different primary cognate audiences: for ECJ judges this is the parties to the 
case and the national judges. Whilst the primary cognate audience for the AG is the ECJ judge whom 
she must assist, the Opinion is also written for the benefit of the national judges and parties, as well as 
those in the legal community – legal academics and lawyers in the EU member states and beyond. 
Similar to the lay judges in Bell’s model, the AG also has a ‘bridging’ function, disseminating 
information from the heart of the EU legal system to the legal community (comprising lawyers and 
legal academics) and the wider community of citizens, activists, politicians, and journalists. In the 
section below, the focus will be on the interaction of the AG with their référendaires. 
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II. The AG Opinion 
If the office of the AG is the needle of international jurisprudence, her Opinion is the thread which 
constitutes the tapestry of EU law. This section will consider the key practices which are used to write 
the Opinion. Like all decision-makers the AG requires reliable sources of information, time to assess 
and evaluate this information and finally must compile this information into a coherent form which 
can be used by the Court to reach and justify a decision. How does the AG do this? As in all cases, the 
search for information begins with the materials submitted as part of the case. The AG receives the 
same information as the judges and uses this material in the Opinion. This can focus on internal EU 
sources or external resources in the MS. Internal resources include colleagues, the case law of the EU 
and comparative law. External resources include academics, former colleagues in the member states 
and practitioners. Of the internal resources, the most important is the référendaire. This group, which 
makes up the largest cohort in the CJEU, plays an important but as yet under-researched role in the 
CJEU. The relationship between the référendaire and his or her AG is as intimate and close as that 
between US judges and their clerks. There is a high level of trust and dependence. As the Cabinet 
represents the only point of dialogue on a case for the AG, within each Cabinet, communication 
between the AG and legal secretary is open. The AG is very reliant upon their référendaires, 
especially the more senior ones, who are expected to produce work which will not need to be edited. 
Their recruitment is therefore of utmost importance. Jarabo Colomer moved his whole secretariat from 
Madrid to Luxembourg. His référendaires tended to be Spanish judges with experience in EU law. 
However, not all are comfortable with the key role played by some legal secretaries. CFI judge Hubert 
Legal, complained in a French legal journal that some judges with limited knowledge of French were 
being held hostage by legal secretaries whom he described as "ayatollahs of free enterprise" who 
"regard the public interest as only an abstract idea or even as suspect."
2
. 
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III. The Search for Information 
Although the Kirchberg is a fairly compact space, housing three courts and the requisite number of 
clerks, not all judicial members talk to each other. Some members are of the opinion that their judicial 
role requires a certain distance to be maintained. This is not due to a lack of collegiality but can be 
attributed to the desire to avoid an impression of trying to exert influence on ones colleagues. Others 
are less concerned about the need to use distance to demonstrate independence: they read and refer to 
each other’s Opinions, visit each other’s Cabinets and even share expertise: for example, if an AG has 
a référendaire is a tax specialist and a colleague who requires assistance on a tax case, it might be that 
the référendaire will be allowed to do provide this. Although cabinets operate independently, there is a 
further situation when interaction may arise. This involves those situations where a new AG or judge 
inherits cases from another Cabinet, due to a change in personnel. In these circumstances, the AG may 
– with the permission of their boss – approach a legal secretary in another Cabinet for assistance. An 
AG with limited language competence within her own Cabinet may also approach a legal secretary in 
another Cabinet. Formal assistance of this nature may also be necessary where an AG falls ill, or 
where a legal secretary in another chamber is an expert on a particular question. Such interaction also 
helps AGs gain an impression of ideas floating in the corridors of the CJEU – like any institution, 
informal interaction is as important as formal in the CJEU. Such interaction aids the AGs as they 
‘assist’ the Court. This is not to suggest that Opinions are tailored to suit prevailing moods, but that 
they may be written so as to speak to them. Informal interaction helps the AG to know what is 
important and respond to it.  
IV. Evaluation of Information 
The evaluation of information is also important for all decision makers. This is perhaps the most 
delicate aspect of any decision making role: how to determine whether information is credible and 
reliable. For the AG, who bears personal responsibility for the contents of the Opinion, the 
référendaire is the most important determinant of the credibility of information, not least because in 
the majority of occasions it is the référendaire who will add flesh to the ideas sketched out by the AG 
– it is rare for an Opinion to be written by the AG from start to finish. Other trusted sources included 
the European Parliament reports, colleagues in the Commission and the member states and legal 
academics. Ultimately it is for the AG to decide who to trust, whether it be a Commissioner or the 
chauffeur! 
A key practice of international jurisprudence, which as yet remains under-researched, is the work 
of the référendaire. These legal clerks discreetly exchange information in offices, hallways and cafes. 
The legal clerks dining in the staff café know what is going on in other Cabinets. Over lunch, coffee 
and dinner, they share and transfer expertise, sensitivities and attitudes about Community law between 
Cabinets and around the Court. This has some advantages: it can prevent conflict between AG 
Opinions and promote collegiality. It can also help mistakes to be spotted before they become 
catastrophes. The legal secretaries generally do not discuss the substance of case but the general 
direction that may be taken. Some members find this indispensable and encourage such interaction. 
However, even if it is discouraged it can occur without the knowledge of the AG. Nonetheless there is 
a limit: whilst the référendaires are important, they cannot take responsibility for the Opinion – only 
the AG can do this. The space for genuine debate between the référendaire and AG varies: some AGs 
are more receptive to the convictions of their legal secretaries: in such circumstances the AG may 
change the direction of the Opinion. The more regular the meetings in the Cabinet, the more editorial 
control. Many cabinets would circulate a first draft of the Opinion within the Cabinet, so that other 
référendaires would act as a filter. In reading each others work, ideas are shared, effectively 
improving all Opinions of the AG. Other Cabinets were more bi-lateral. Regardless of the number of 
discussions, the ultimate decision rests with the AG. Evaluation of information therefore includes 
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dialogue within and beyond the Cabinet, and sometimes even beyond the Court. Of course, it goes 
without saying that the level of dialogue depends upon the character of the individuals concerned. In 
addition, it depends to some extent upon the legal system with which members are familiar and the 
working practices they have developed in previous appointments. Whilst the most detailed discussions 
are intra-cabinet, interaction – both formal and informal - between référendaires across the Court is 
equally important for the AG. This was needless to say more straightforward in a Court of 15 member 
states. The amount of informal interaction is arguably now somewhat reduced given the current size of 
the ECJ and the change which this has wrought in the culture of the Court. 
V. Crystallisation of Information 
Surprisingly, there is a level of shared practice in relation to the writing of the Opinion. In all cases, it 
is the AG who sets the direction of the Opinion but procedure differs thereafter. A French member 
used to the civil law system might, for example, be content to leave all drafting to the référendaires: 
this would again only be possible if the référendaire were knowledgeable and senior enough to be 
entrusted with this task. For some members the référendaires are jurists in their own right. 
Alternatively, a British member might feel more comfortable engaging référendaires at all levels, 
from the most junior to the most senior, in debate upon the key issues but not trust the final writing of 
the Opinion to anybody else. The distribution of the workload within the Cabinet is a matter for the 
AG. This task may be delegated to a Senior Legal Secretary. Alternatively, the Advocate General may 
decide to assign cases himself. It is questionable whether the former or the latter procedure contributes 
more to harmony within the Cabinet - some cabinets are more hierarchical than others but a certain 
level of team-working is necessary in order for the time limits to be met. Case assignment can involve 
recognition of the interests, strengths and weaknesses of the référendaires. The norm is for the AG to 
do little of the writing themselves, but give guidance to the legal secretary as to where she wants the 
Opinion to go, in particular identifying the legal reasoning and allowing the référendaire to write 
drafts. Very rarely would the AG write a first draft. An AG may choose not write a single paragraph in 
an Opinion whilst others would take great pains to do a lot of the writing themselves. In a few cases, 
the AG would write the whole Opinion, leaving the référendaire to do minor edits. If an intricate legal 
point was being made, the AG could supply the precise wording to be used. Other legal secretaries 
were left to write the Opinion, which the AG would edit and hand back or make changes herself. Each 
legal secretary would have her own case to work on; big cases could be worked on by everybody. In 
all cases – save where the AG wrote the Opinion herself – the work would be checked by the AG. The 
key to success for a legal secretary, however, lies in the ability to anticipate the direction of thinking of 
the AG: the fewer changes made by the AG, the more successful the effort of the référendaire. The 
poorer the pre-draft communication in the Cabinet, the more editing the AG would need to do. Thus it 
behoves the AG to take the time to discuss the general orientation of the Opinion with the 
référendaires – decide the way to go, what the issues are and how they should be resolved. Likewise, 
the more personal the style of the Opinion, the more the AG would need to edit it. Typically, 
following discussions with the référendaires, a first draft is prepared six weeks before the oral hearing.  
VI. Conclusion 
The AG contributes to the practice of international jurisprudence in two ways: first, the office itself 
and secondly in the way in which the AG ‘assists’ the Court via creation of the Opinion. Both the 
office and the Opinion are embedded in a network of relations. The AG practice of international 
jurisprudence in a court such as the CJEU is in some respects like that of members in any court – there 
is a premium upon reliable information, a need for evaluation of this and a phase of crystallisation of 
information during drafting of the decision. What may differ at the CJEU is that the AG adds a 
transparency and porosity to the CJEU that is not shared by other courts. However, there is no single 
practice employed – it changes according to the habits of each member. In particular, the Cabinet is as 
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closed or porous as desired by its head, the CJEU member. The référendaire plays a crucial role. It is 
difficult to know the full importance of their interaction in the functioning of the CJEU but over-
looking their role may reduce our understanding of the practice of international jurisprudence. They 
are not only central to the search for information, but as mentioned above, play a key role in its 
evaluation, its transmission and co-ordination into a coherent form in the Opinion. It may be true to 
say that whilst there is secrecy vis à vis the outside world, there are few secrets within the CJEU. To 
some extent members do not need to talk to each other as long as their référendaires do so. The 
working methods within the Cabinet will be determined by the experience or inexperience of the 
référendaire, the character and knowledge of the AG and the complexity of the case. The more 
experienced and mature the référendaire, the greater latitude given by the AG. The more confident the 
AG that the legal secretary can anticipate what he is thinking, the more autonomy the legal secretary 
will have. Ultimately, the Advocate General bears responsibility for all statements found in the 
Opinion. It may be argued that the more porous a Cabinet, the greater the opportunity for diversity of 
thought and conviction to inform the Opinion and judgment. Diversity is to some extent built into the 
AG role – each AG writes in her own language to produce what is ultimately an individual statement 
on EU law. The AG, and in particular her autonomy, is therefore crucial to the practice of international 
jurisprudence at the CJEU – at present, given the appointment procedures, it is the only source of 
diversity to inform decision-making at this court. 
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The Definition of ‘Best Judicial Practices’ by 
Judicial and Legal Expert Networks and Commissions 
Cristina Dallara* 
I. State of the art: the Fashionable Concept of Network in the Judiciary 
Over the past decade, there has been a striking blossoming of judicial networks across Europe. From a 
wide-ranging perspective, judicial networks can be described as groups, conferences, commissions or 
organizations of legal experts, judges and academics (coming from different countries) established at a 
transnational level. Overall, the activities of these networks can be summarized as an exchange of 
ideas and practices, in the production of recommendations, opinions and best practices concerning 
different fields of law and the functioning of the judicial system and in the organization of seminars, 
conferences and training of judges and legal experts. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s description of transnational judicial governance as most emblematic of a 
“new world order” has opened a new research avenue1. There is now a whole stream of research from 
political science, law and sociology investigating this emerging worldwide phenomenon
2
. As a side of 
the multifaceted phenomenon of the Global Governance, transnational judicial governance is 
characterized by: the participation of public and private actors other than States (such as 
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, 
networks of scientists and experts and human rights activists) and the predominance of soft-law
3
 as 
mechanism of relationship and co-operation among the actors just mentioned.  
In this respect, Slaughter (2004) underlines that in the context of a networked world judges are 
among the most surprising networkers actively engaged with their counterparts around the world. As 
she claims “Judges around the world are talking to one another: exchanging opinions, meeting face to 
face in seminars and judicial organizations, and even negotiating with one another over the outcome of 
specific cases”4. They mostly participate in information and enforcement networks, thus contributing 
to a gradual construction of a global legal system. 
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On the same line, Ferrarese (2010)
5
 in a recent inclusive study on governance puts “judicial 
governance” as one of the main expression of the Global Governance. Judicial governance, acting 
mainly throughout soft-law instruments, is one of these new institutional settings producing a new 
form of global law in most different fields. Networks of constitutional, supreme and lower courts, 
panels and forums of judges and prosecutors, conferences and meetings of judges and legal experts, all 
are expressions of the judicial governance. Vauchez (2008)
6
, focusing on the European legal space, 
emphasizes also that lawyers and legal experts throughout multiple networks acting around the 
European institutions contribute to the construction and the legitimization of a specific political order. 
Operating in legal and political arenas of mediation at the European level they actively contribute to 
the creation and to the functioning of a new European legal field. In Europe, during the last decade, 
not only networks of lawyers gained relevance, but also networks of judges and prosecutors have set 
new standards of quality of justice and delivered recommendations regarding the implementation of 
judicial independence principles. Through collaborative works and meetings organized within judicial 
networks, judges enforce their routines and their ways of interaction. It is well known that these 
networks have been particularly relevant for judges and prosecutors coming from the newly 
democratic States in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans to discuss changes in their legal 
systems and spread off new ideas and legal ideologies. However, as Vauchez (2008)
7
 pointed out, so 
far the legal and political science scholarship has essentially focused on “outcomes” in terms of 
jurisprudence and judicial decision-making, with a particular interest in cross-referencing between 
national Supreme courts. This misunderstands what is actually “at stake” in these settings. What 
circulates among these networks is not just references to judicial decisions (the so-called “cross-
fertilization” or “judicial comitology”), but more general opinions, best practices and reports related to 
shared values and elements of rhetoric, judicial procedural standards and models of professional 
excellence, etc. Moreover, many of these soft-law documents deal with crucial aspects of the judicial 
system organization and functioning such as judge status and role or guarantees of judicial 
independence. 
The added value of a socio-political research approach to this topic is that it better allow to open up 
the black box of “judicial networks”, offering a deeper understanding of this emerging “European 
community of Courts” through a fine-grained exploration of transnational judicial fora8. Being they 
academic conferences, summer schools, training sessions, experts’ commissions, contact points or 
professional organizations where judges from a variety of countries meet and exchange. With 
reference to the European context and, more specifically, in the domain of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice - as designed by the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Program
9
 - my main 
hypothesis (following Magrassi)
10
 is that networks, commissions and associations of the judiciary 
could to be considered as new actors of the EU policy-making and mediators between supranational 
institutions and national judiciaries. 
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Thus, the specific aim of this paper is to focus at tools and know-how that are elaborated within 
such networks. In what follows, we will analyse only the judicial networks created within the Council 
of Europe will be analysed, focusing in particular on best practices and guidelines about the 
organization of the judicial systems, guarantees of judicial independence, appointments procedures 
and functioning of the judicial institutions (for example, self-governing bodies of judges, Judicial 
Commissions, appointment commissions, etc.). Finally, a tentative analysis of the “efficacy” of these 
tools will be proposed looking in particular at some cases in which judicial networks opinions and 
reports (in particular those of the Venice Commission) have been embedded and cited in the ECHR 
ruling or in European Commission official text given them a sort of “hard-law efficacy”. 
II. Judicial Networks as a Way to Promote a EU Judicial System Model? 
The analysis of the Networks activity regarding the organization of the judicial systems could offer an 
interesting research perspective. In fact, although, the organization of the judicial system is totally a 
matter of national sovereignty, as the EU has no competences in this respect, there are attempts of 
harmonization also in this field. The recent European Justice Portal, elaborated by the European 
Commission, contains a section focused on “Judicial Systems” expressing that “While the judicial 
systems of the Member States differ significantly in detail, there is a set of common principles which 
apply to all of them, as well as to the EU as such. One of these common principles is that the courts 
must be impartial and independent of the government and the legislator (i.e. the institution(s) passing 
the law). This principle of independence of the judiciary is one of the values on which the EU is 
founded: the rule of law and respect for freedom, equality and fundamental rights. It is specifically 
mentioned in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and in Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.” But, this is not the only way through which the 
harmonization of the judicial systems structure is pursed. In this respect, a key role is played by the 
multitude of networks and commissions working in this field as consultancy or advisory bodies of 
European institutions.  
The number and the variety of European judicial networks are increasingly growing, for this reason 
different approaches could be adopted in order to describe this phenomenon. A first categorization 
divides European judicial networks into two main categories: by one hand, bodies composed by 
members which cooperate by performing judicial functions and, by the other hand, networks that have 
been established in order to promote training, cultural exchange and lobby activity aimed at foster the 
autonomy and the independence of the judiciary. Another categorization takes into account 
organisational aspects; accordingly, networks can be distinguished into two main typologies, that is 
institutional networks and technical networks composed by national contact points. A useful 
classification is the one suggested by Magrassi (2011)
11
 distinguishing between:  
1. instruments for the cooperation in the exercise of the judicial function by national judges and 
EU judges- such as the European Judicial Network in criminal matters (EJN-Criminal) and the 
European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (EJN-Civil);  
2. other cooperative dynamics involving judicial professions and judicial institutions- such as the 
European Networks of the Council for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of the Presidents of 
the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union and the networks of judges, prosecutors 
and legal experts the created within the Council of Europe: the Consultative Committee of 
European Judges – CCJE; the Consultative Committee of European Prosecutors – CCPE; the 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice – CEPEJ; the European Committee on 
Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) and the European Commission for Democracy through Law - the 
Venice Commission.  
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Other types of networks of experts (in both civil and criminal matters) have been created by EU 
legislature or by CoE conventions with the aim of promoting the exchange of information and 
experiences. This category comprises bodies as: and the Networks of contact points to fight against 
cybercrime, provided for by art. 35 of CoE Convention on cybercrime. Liaison networks aims at 
supporting the promotion of common policies concerning specific topic.  
Table 1 displays a partial mapping of the European networks of judicial professions and judicial 
institutions. The first five Networks are those established within the Council of Europe, the others are 
spontaneous Networks created by various judicial institutions or groups of judges around Europe. In 
this type of Networks the membership is generally nationally based, meaning that the members are the 
single state or the judicial institutions of a specific state (for example, the Supreme Court of a 
country), then two (or more) judges, civil servants or legal experts are appointed to represent the state 
or the judicial institution member of the Network. Focusing specifically on networks of judicial 
institutions and professionals, it seems that they are more and more affecting the circulation of models 
of judicial systems organization, especially in the newly democratic countries in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans
12
, but also among the old member states of the EU. This happens by way of a multitude of 
tools and instruments, such as conferences, training courses, collaborative projects and, particularly, 
with the diffusion of not-legally binding documents having the form of reports, opinions, best-
practices and guidelines. 
Given these tools, one can distinguish two different channels through which models of judicial 
system organization are diffused. The first one is based on the participation in the Networks and on the 
activities they organize. By such, judicial best practices are diffused, internally, among the Networks 
members and/or, outside, among the external participants in their seminars, courses and conferences. 
In this respect, the list of the seminars and conferences organized by the Networks on the topics such 
as “judicial independence”, “judicial councils”, “judicial appointment”, “judges’ status”, etc. is 
impressive. In this case, the diffusion of judicial system models is based on an indirect pressure upon 
legal culture throughout socialization and persuasion
13
. The second channel is indeed based on 
standard-settings based on recommendations, opinions and best practices. Here, especially in the 
documents of the CoE Networks, “minimum standards” of democracy and rule of law are proposed. 
Without analysing in details this type of documents, it is sufficient to notice that they also propose in a 
nuanced way also institutional models for the organization of judicial systems and judicial institutions. 
For example, an opinion, issued by one the Networks listed above (CCJE), suggests the creation of 
High Councils of the Judiciary as the best way “to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and 
the rule of law”14. 
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Table 1. Provisional list of networks of judicial professionals and judicial institutions in EU
15
 
                                                     
15
 Source: Updated from Coman R. and Dallara C. (2010), Handbook on Judicial Politics , at 299, (Iasi, EuroInst). 
European network  Organizational unit  
(type of judicial institution in the 
network) 
Outputs and Products 
European Commission for 
Democracy through Law - 
the Venice Commission  
Judges or academics representing 
the member states. 
Guidelines for the application of the judicial 
review, opinions and assistance on 
constitutional matters. 
Consultative Committee of 
European Judges - CCJE 
Ordinary judges  Guidelines and opinions for the organization 
of the judicial systems  
Consultative Committee of 
European Prosecutors – 
CCPE 
Ordinary Prosecutors  Guidelines and opinions for the 
administration of penal justice  
European Committee on 
Legal Co-operation - CDCJ 
Representatives of all the CoE 
member states, principally from the 
ministries of justice. 
Standard-setting activities in the field of 
public and private law 
European Commission for 
the Efficiency of Justice – 
CEPEJ 
Judges and judicial experts Projects, guidelines and programmes for the 
administration of justice. 
Network of the Presidents 
of the Supreme Courts  
Supreme Courts  Guidelines for the cross-national use of the 
case law of the high courts.  
European Networks of the 
Council for the Judiciary – 
ENJC 
High Judicial Council  Guidelines for the administration of the High 
Judicial Councils 
European Judicial Training 
Network - ENJT 
Center and schools for Judicial 
Training  
Exchanges of judicial training programmes  
Conference of European 
Constitutional Courts 
(CECC)  
Constitutional Courts  Congresses; exchange of information as 
regards issues of methods and practice of 
constitutional review; Opinions in the areas 
of public law and constitutional jurisdiction.  
Association of the Councils 
of State and Supreme 
Administrative 
Jurisdictions of the 
European Union 
ACA-Europe 
CJEU, Councils of States and other 
supreme administrative 
jurisdictions 
Detailed information on the administrative 
jurisdictions in each EU Member State; 
reports and newsletter; a guide to preliminary 
ruling proceedings before the CJEU with 
direct case law, etc. 
Association of European 
Administrative Judges 
(AEAJ)  
National associations of 
administrative judges and courts 
Defending the interests of European 
administrative judges; Meetings of 
administrative judges; Newsletter and reports 
Association of European 
Competition Law Judges 
(AECLJ) 
Groups national judges working in 
the area of European competition 
law 
Promoting knowledge and understanding of 
competition policy and law issues throughout 
the respective judiciaries of the EU.  
The European Judges and 
Prosecutors Association 
(EJPA) 
 Judges from nine different 
European countries (France, Spain, 
Italy, Portugal, Germany, 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania).  
Training, reports and tools to improve the 
mutual knowledge of judiciary systems. 
Ex. A chatting list and a Justice phone book. 
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Opinions, recommendations and best practices could be requested by the individual countries member 
of the Networks (concerning specific draft law or amendments or specific problems) or by other 
European bodies. In the case of the CoE Networks, opinions are requested, as legal adviser activity, by 
the CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Committee of Ministers and Secretary General and also by the 
European Union (namely the European Parliament or the European Commission). The minimum 
standards suggested in the documents remain non-binding in their nature. This means that countries 
can decide whether or not to follow them. Clearly, very often individual states request opinions to gain 
a sort of international legitimization, thus they follow or they recall the opinions in a strategic way. 
This is an important aspect that cannot be developed here because of space constraints. But, in spite of 
the non-legally binding nature of the Networks documents, it is possible to identify a recent trend by 
which opinions, recommendations and best practices are frequently cited as “Other relevant sources” 
in the ECHR rulings or even explicitly used by the European Commission to evaluate the compliance 
of a country with the EU values and criteria. This happened and is still happening not only in the case 
of the acceding countries involved in the Enlargement process but also with respect to member states. 
This new role the documents issued by Networks implies also a more “coercitive” form of judicial 
system models diffusion. Here the point is that, although in the EU the choice of a model of judicial 
governance remains matter of each state’s sovereignty, it seems that throughout Judicial Network 
documents EU institutions are pursuing also a goal of “institutional harmonization” of the judicial 
systems.  
De Visser and Claes (2012)
16
 in their analysis of transnational judicial Networks already underlined 
how judicial networks could, potentially, provide the missing link in the European architecture. Thus 
the Networks become strategic policy arenas for national judges and, at the same time, “back-stage 
actors” of the EU judicial policy. This hypothesis could be only accurately verified looking at the 
future development of EU action in the AFJS building. Nevertheless, a tentative picture of this 
tendency could be drawn examining in details the activity of some Networks. 
III. Opinions, Guidelines and Best Practices on Judicial Organization. A Way to 
Promote a Common European Judicial System? 
In this paper I have decided to limit my analysis to the Networks established within the CoE and in 
particular on the Venice Commission. The reason to look at the CoE Networks is twofold: first of all, 
these networks are until now less studied in respect to the other networks; secondly, as they are placed 
within the CoE, more and more the key advisory partner of the EU on legal cooperation and other 
matters, it is possible to better verify if and how Networks could influence the EU judicial policy. 
Piana (2010) defines the CoE a “partner for prestige”17 of the European Commission in the domain of 
legal and judicial cooperation, highlighting that the CoE with the enlargement towards Central and 
Eastern Europe was vested of a leading role in setting standards (throughout its Networks) in the 
justice field. Today, the CoE is increasingly applying its empowered agenda in the justice field both 
towards current EU member states and other countries. This is also coherent with the conclusions of 
the Junker Report (2006)
18
 on the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European 
Commission with suggests that: “to move forward on the path to this pan-European legal and judicial 
area, the EU and the Council of Europe should also set up a joint platform to assess the feasibility of 
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the EU’s taking over Council standards, and vice-versa, each in accordance with its own 
responsibilities.” Concerning the CoE Networks, I skip here the description of structure, membership 
and functions
19
 just focusing on the documents they have shaped in the domain of judicial system 
organization. Concerning the Opinions of the CCJE (Consultative Committee of European Judges) it is 
interesting to focus the attention on the topics they deal with. They range from “Standards concerning 
the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges”, “Training for judges”, “Council 
for the Judiciary in the service of society", to “Relations between Judges and Prosecutors in a 
democratic society”.20 All are topics related to the organization of the judicial system and concerning 
the content, as cited above in footnote 69, they propose “best solutions or practices” to organize 
judicial institutions. For example, as already mentioned, the High Councils of the Judiciary are 
suggested as the best way “to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law”.  
As for the Opinions of the CCPE (Consultative Committee of European Prosecutors), their content 
and the type of suggestions they propose is very similar to the ones of the CCJE.
21
 The CDCJ 
(European Committee on Legal Co-operation) is formed by the representative of the minister of 
justice; although formally the Network deals with a broad range of topics (family law and children’s 
rights: nationality law and families, administrative law, justice and rule of law, data protection), it 
issued also some relevant documents related to judicial organization. For example, the Resolution N. 1 
(on a modern, transparent and efficient justice), the Recommendation N. R (86) 12 (concerning 
measures to prevent and reduce the excessive workload in the courts), a draft Recommendation on the 
role of public prosecutors outside the criminal justice system and finally an important 
Recommendation on judges independence, efficiency and responsibilities.
22
 then adopted by the CoE 
Committee of Ministers and defined as the most authoritative text at European level.
23
 
The documents elaborated by the CEPEJ (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice) are 
instead less focused on the institutional role of the judiciary or on the guarantees of judicial 
independence and more tailored on the efficient functioning of justice. Thus, they elaborated also more 
practical tools to be applied in the concrete courts management, such as Handbook for court 
satisfaction surveys, Compendium of "best practices" on time management of judicial proceedings, 
Time management checklist, Checklist for promoting the quality of justice and the courts.
24
 
Finally, there is the multitude of Opinions elaborated by the Venice Commission (VC).
25
 Perhaps 
the most widely known CoE Commission. Concerning the VC, it is worth to mention that this 
Network it is not only formed by judges or prosecutors; members are primarily academics, supreme or 
constitutional court judges or members of national parliaments. Moreover, many of the academics 
appointed by the national government at the VC are or were judges in the Constitutional or Supreme 
courts. Although the original mission of the VC was specifically related to the “Constitutional 
assistance” (as it is the CoE advisory body on constitutional matters) 26, during the last ten years, the 
number and the type of activities performed by this network have been significantly increased, behind 
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its original function of advisor on constitutional matters: the Commission has played an increasing 
global role in producing knowledge, documents, opinions and guidelines on various governance 
issues
27
. In fact, the subject area covered by the Venice Commission has been categorized in its 
official annual reports as follow: 1) Democratic development of public institutions and respect for 
human rights; 2) Constitutional justice, ordinary justice and ombudsman; 3) Democracy through free 
and fair elections.
28
 Within these areas, also the topic of judicial system organization finds place. In 
fact, the VC has produced many Opinions on specific country laws related to the judicial system, 
judicial appointment, judges status, etc. These Opinions were requested either by individual countries, 
or by the CoE bodies. 
Recently, the VC has further broaden its production elaborating Opinions not only concerning a 
specific country law, but also on European Standards of judicial independence, on European Standards 
of the Prosecution Service and on the judicial appointment.
29
 Focusing on these documents, it is 
possible to find out relevant information about the “model of judicial system” they propose. Just to 
summarize it, the VC propose a “Mediterranean model of organization of justice” with a judicial body 
with members elected by the judges themselves and other members appointed by other powers of the 
state. This body should be entrusted with the most relevant functions concerning the judges’ career 
and judges should be the majority in it. This body should be, consequently, in charge of the judges’ 
appointment. Concerning the prosecution service, the VC requires that the independence of the 
prosecution office and of its holders is guaranteed in relation with the government. As Magrassi 
(2011) pointed out, this is clearly a model based on self-government and separation from other legal 
professions, with a very limited influence of common law and models of judicial governance in place, 
for example, in the North-European countries. 
This model, proposed by the VC, formed in many cases the basis of the judicial reforms adopted in 
Central and Eastern Europe countries during the EU accession stage. This is still the term of reference 
for the Balkans countries currently potential candidate for the EU membership.
30
 Here the VC 
suggestions were, and are, spontaneously adopted by countries as a way of international legitimization 
of the national reforms. But what it is most surprising are recent cases in which the VC Opinions and 
Recommendations, and also the documents of other Networks,
31
 were used as “relevant material” for 
the judgement in the ECHR rulings or defined as “standards to apply” in some European Commission 
and European Parliament actions. This is, at this stage, one of the most interesting aspects to analyze 
in relation to the Networks status and activity in EU.  
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IV. An Increasing Influence of Judicial Networks? 
How Soft-law is Embedded in Hard-law Tools  
Two recent cases are, in my opinion, remarkable to ascertain how the Networks tools and know-how is 
gaining relevance. The first one is an ECHR ruling on “Bulanov and Kupchik vs Ukraine” issued on 
March 2011. The case it quite simple in itself: two Ukrainian citizens (their application were joined 
due to the common legal background) complained that their cases did not obtain access to appeal due 
to an apparent conflict of jurisdiction between the Higher Administrative Court and the Supreme 
Court.
32
 Here the ECHR, after having cited all the relevant Ukrainian laws for the topic, lists as 
“Relevant Council of Europe material” the Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Law on Judicial 
System in Ukraine. The Opinion is cited as follow: “The Supreme Court's jurisdiction should ... 
reflect[s] its constitutional status as the highest judicial body in the system of courts of general 
jurisdiction. Recommendations for improvement of the Law include inter alia: The Supreme Court 
should be allowed to exercise its jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between the high specialised courts 
also in matters of procedural law and the Court should be able to decide itself on the admissibility of 
cases involving a conflict in the interpretation of the law. It should also be made competent to resolve 
conflicts of jurisdiction between the three sorts of jurisdiction (civil and criminal, commercial and 
administrative).” Then in the decision, the ECHR sentence reports: “The Court does not find it 
necessary in the circumstances to examine whether the Supreme Court or the Higher Administrative 
Court had jurisdiction to determine the merits of the applicants' appeals. What is important is that the 
applicants did not obtain a “determination” of their appeals because the Higher Administrative Court 
refused to follow the rulings of the Supreme Court determining jurisdiction over their cases. Such 
refusals not only deprived the applicants of access to court but also undermined the authority of 
judicial power. [..] The Court further notes that the observations of the Venice Commission and the 
Council of Europe Directorates are particularly relevant to this aspect of the case.” The Court 
concludes that there was a violation of the Article 6.1 of the Convention and the right access to court 
was not secured.  
The relevance of the Venice Commission Opinion relies on the fact that it was cited as the standard 
to follow in order to establish the Supreme Court competences. In this way the VC Recommendation 
acquires a different status in respect of the non-legally binding document it was supposed to be. 
Another interesting case is related to the high pitched debate on the Hungarian Constitution. Here, 
although the process is still under way, the European Commission gave an unprecedented relevance to 
the Venice Commission documents about the Constitution. Already in June 2011 the Venice 
Commission released an opinion on the new Hungarian constitution making several recommendations 
regarding the text. Many of these recommendations were echoed in the EU Parliament's resolution 
adopted on 2011, July 7. After that, On 17 January 2012 the European Commission started 
infringement procedures
33
 against Hungary with regard to the independence of the central bank, the 
lowering of the mandatory retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 years old, and the independence of 
the data protection authority. The Commission also asked the Hungarian authorities for further 
information on the independence of the judiciary. The EU Parliament repetitively asked to the EU 
Commission to activate EU Treaty Article 7, which is used in the event of a clear threat of a serious 
breach of EU common values. On March 7 the EU Commission decided to continue accelerated 
infringement procedure.
34
 In two areas Hungary failed to comply with the EU Law: the retirement age 
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of judges – which would lead to the anticipated retirement of 236 judges in Hungary – and the 
independence of the country's data protection authority. The European Commission therefore decided 
to send two reasoned opinions – the second stage under EU infringement procedures after which the 
matter may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In two other areas, the 
independence of the central bank and further aspects concerning the independence of the judiciary, the 
Commission sent two administrative letters demanding further clarifications. In its administrative 
letter, the Commission is seeking further clarifications about the independence of the country's 
judiciary. The Commission has asked for explanations relating to the powers attributed to the 
President of the National Judicial Office, particularly the President’s powers to designate a court in a 
given case and the transfer of judges without consent. The Commission also raised concerns with 
regard to potentially systemic deficiencies in Hungary's justice system. Hungary is reminded that 
national courts act as "Union courts" whenever they apply EU law, and therefore need to satisfy 
minimum standards of independence and effective judicial redress. Without entering here in detail of a 
complex case for the EU governance, what it is relevant for my purpose is to notice as many of the 
concerns expressed by the EU Commission in its official communications and documents were drawn 
by the Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission on 17-18 June 
2011.
35
 
Moreover, as regards to judicial independence for instance, the Venice Commission presented a 
specific Opinion on the Law issued by the Hungarian parliament. The Administrative letter of the EU 
Commission (described above) was largely based on this document. Looking at the EU Parliament and 
EU Commission press release on the Hungarian case, one can notices as great relevance is given to the 
Venice Commission work and expected documents on the Hungarian laws, thus it seems also very 
likely that the final judgment of the EU Commission will be based, partially or not, on the Venice 
Commission Opinions. Although, very roughly described, this is another interesting evidence of the 
increasing role of such judicial and legal-experts Networks also in legally binding procedure. 
The two cases are here intended to give example of this unofficial trend and allow to advance some 
conclusion and to propose further research questions.  
V. Conclusions 
According to the literature on this topic and to the early finding of my research, Networks of judges 
and legal experts are gaining relevance as new actors of the EU (and beyond the EU) legal space. They 
are not only a suitable interpretative instrument to describe the current changes affecting legal 
systems, but also a good tool to regulate the relations between legal actors through flexible but 
formalised arrangements. Nowadays they represents a key feature of the new global governance. In 
order to manage new challenges and threats, growing attention was paid on cooperation by networks 
involving judicial authorities, since it can contribute to build trust among participants by offering 
technical assistance and professional socialization to members and by focusing on the power of 
information. The activities of the Networks that I have analyzed are mainly related to the domain of 
judicial systems (courts and judicial institutions) functioning, judges role and guarantees of 
impartiality/independence. Here the point is that, although in the EU the organization and the rules 
concerning judicial systems remains matter of each state’ sovereignty, it seems that Judicial Networks 
are proposing a “quasi-model” of judicial governance, within and outside the EU. This activity 
supported by the EU institutions is functional to the “institutional and legal harmonization” of the 
judicial systems that is one of the preconditions of the AFSJ. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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As already stated, with reference to the European AFSJ, the main hypothesis is that networks, 
commissions and associations of the judiciary should be considered as new emerging actors of the EU 
policy-making related to the Area of Justice and mediators between supranational institutions and 
national judiciaries. On the basis of the early findings of our analysis, among the actors participating in 
the complex governance system of EU AFSJ, judicial networks together with other network-based 
forms of cooperation can be considered as a “sustainable operational tool”36 since, as evidenced by the 
relevant literature, they involve a low-sacrifice standard for jurisdictional sovereignty of member 
states. Network, conceived as an organisational mode to exercise certain Union’s competencies by 
means of plural and decentralised structures, represents a pragmatic and reasonable choice, since in 
absence of a sufficient level of legal harmonisation, it can be used with instrumental purposes in order 
to meet both the need to preserve state sovereignty and to guarantee an effective cooperation in 
judicial matter.  
Therefore, network-based system of cooperation within AFSJ may be a particularly appropriate 
system to ensure coordination and communication between “nodes” and, at the same time, to avoid the 
risk of an EU vertical direction. With the Stockholm Programme (2010-14) judicial cooperation, 
mutual trust in legal systems of the Member states and coordination among them became the strategic 
goals for the functioning of the AFSJ. The Programme stressed specifically the circulation among 
States of guidelines, best-practices and other operative tools to reach the abovementioned goals. In this 
window of opportunity Judicial Networks are increasingly playing their game as they already put in 
place cooperative dynamics among judges and courts; already produced guidelines, best-practices and 
documents useful for coordination; already organized intensive training programs for EU and non-EU 
judges and legal professionals. Thus, they are in a position of “competitive advantage” in filling gaps 
within the construction of an EU area of justice. Moreover, also recent documents issued by the 
European Commission on the creation of the EU Area of Justice, stressed the relevance of Judicial 
Networks as actors of the EU judicial policy. On 13 September 2011, the European Commission has 
adopted the Communication "Building trust in EU-wide justice: a new dimension to European judicial 
training". Here is explained as “The Commission is encouraging national and European level 
networks, professional organisations and training structures to work together, exchange best practices 
on training methods, build consortia, and set up trans-sectoral training activities. Then, in the Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Justice Programme COM(2011) 
759, this Specific action is described: “support for main actors, […] support for key European level 
networks whose activities are linked to the implementation of the objectives of the Programme; 
networking among specialised bodies and organisations, […]; funding of experts' networks; […]”. 
Finally, the EC Justice Programme 2014-2020, with a budget of €416 million, aims to the creation of a 
European area of justice by promoting judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. Specific 
action to be supported in the Programme will be: “Strengthening EU cooperation on justice and rights 
issues through networks of legal practitioners, non-governmental organizations and policy-makers”. If 
Networks (as collective entity) gain relevance as actors of the EU Area of Justice policy making, then 
they also became strategic policy arenas in which national judges try to impose their national judicial 
behavior and their models of judicial system organization (mediation between national and 
international). One can hypothesize for example, that clear preference of many Networks for the so-
called Mediterranean model of judicial system could be explained by the high number of judges and 
legal experts coming from Southern-European countries and by their activism within the Networks. 
Here, as in other policy field, the rational is the more the national model will be diffused in other 
countries, the less will be the coordination and the adaptation costs. Further steps and results are 
needed in order to verify this hypothesis. 
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The Role of Majoritarian Activism in Precedent Formation 
at the European Court of Human Rights 
Bilyana Petkova* 
I. Majoritarian Activism in European Constitutional Adjudication 
The concept of ‘majoritarian activism’, originally thought of as describing the realities of European 
economic integration, appears to be a broader characteristic of (European) constitutional adjudication. 
Miguel Maduro coined the term when reviewing the application of Articles 34 and 36 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Whereas Article 34 introduces a prohibition on 
national measures imposing quantitative and equivalent restrictions on imports, Article 36 ‘qualifies’ it 
by allowing non-discriminatory national restrictions on inter-state trade on the grounds of public 
policy. In his interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) case law in this 
area, Maduro found that when confronted with cases regarding State regulation of traditional national 
products, the Luxembourg Court adopted majoritarian approach – in other words, if there was a 
‘minoritarian interest – one state’s tradition – as opposed to the majoritarian interest, which takes the 
form of the interests of all other Member States not sharing or conforming to that tradition’, the Court 
would strike down the national regulation in question,
1
 and in many cases establish a precedent. 
Whereas the CJEU upheld national measures if a majoritarian view was difficult to ascertain, it caught 
national regulation in the net of Article 34 TFEU when not supported by a majority (but usually not 
all) of the EU Member States.  
The CJEU’s and the ECtHR’s use of majoritarian activism in the area of fundamental rights before 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was compared with the use of a similar approach in adjudicating 
rights taken up by a federal judiciary – the U.S. Supreme Court2. In view of the recently made binding 
nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and pending accession to the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR)
3, the CJEU feels the pressure to start ‘taking rights seriously’.4 Procedures and 
practices adopted by the Strasbourg Court such as the use of majoritarian activism as a mechanism for 
defining the scope of rights can become all the more relevant in the EU in a post-Lisbon xontext, yet 
their very position and effect on the case law of the ECtHR has not been examined with the necessary 
level of scrutiny. 
A keyword in this debate should be the meaning that the ECtHR attaches to ‘facts’. Arguably, 
rather than being given a strictly positivist expression – existence or not of legal standards to be 
applied, the state of law and the scope of a certain legal provision in Contracting States as well as 
internationally, are understood by the Strasbourg Court as facts bearing on the merits of a case. In his 
classical study on precedent formation in common law, Salmond
5
 holds that in theory: 
In the case of questions of fact, …the presumption of the correctness of judicial decisions results 
in the creation of new law, not in the declaration and proof of old.  
                                                     
*
 Ph. Candidate at the University of Kent at Brussels, Visiting Researcher at Yale Law School. Many thanks to Harm 
Schepel, Yutaka Arai-Takashi, Robert Post and the participants in the workshop “The Fabric of International 
Jurisprudence” that took place at the EUI, Florence, in March 2011. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution: A Critical Reading of 
Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998) at 72-3.  
2
 Petkova, ‘The Notion of Consensus as a Route to Democratic Adjudication? The United States Supreme Court, the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights Compared’ (forthcoming, 2011-2012) 14 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies.  
3
 Article 6 (2) TFEU.  
4
 Coppel and O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ 12 Legal Studies 227, (1992).  
5
 Salmond, ‘Theory of Judicial Precedents’16 Law Quarterly Review, 376. (1900) at 386.  
Bilyana Petkova 
36 
 
Applied to European constitutional adjudication, the understanding of Salmond raises interesting 
questions: first, what is the role of comparative law facts in unravelling incomplete Treaty provisions, 
e.g. with regards possible lacunas in the law,
6
 and second, could there be a strict division between facts 
and merits, especially in borderline human rights cases?
7
  
II. The Use of Majoritarian Activism in ECtHR Precedents 
In general, majoritarian activism is exemplified by the ECtHR’s recourse to ‘emerging consensus’, 
‘common European approach’, ‘common ground’, ‘tendency’ or a ‘steady development in the law, a 
formula that will be referred to for short as Consensus Analysis (CA). As discussed below, the 
increasingly broad factual basis to which the Court refers and has at its disposition thanks to third 
parties, dictates that conceptualisation of CA cannot be restricted to merely a discussion on the use of 
the comparative method.  
Majoritarian activism was first discussed in the context of qualified provisions interpreted by the 
CJEU. I now turn on to examine in further detail the way the ECtHR applies majoritarian activism to 
qualified rights enshrined in the Convention. In order to avoid bias in case selection, I work with a 
dataset of 312 cases. The dataset comprises of case law in which the plaintiffs relied on qualified 
rights – Articles 8-12 – of the Convention in the period after the adoption of Protocol 11 (representing 
a milestone in the development of the ECtHR since it allowed individuals to petition the Court 
directly) up to the present day. Qualified rights are also present in the Protocols to the Convention and 
as subject to proportionality and CA, were also counted in the dataset when evoked in conjunction 
with Articles 8-12. Each of the discussed qualified rights is subject to a number of restrictions for 
‘legitimate purposes’. Restrictions vary from protection to ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ to 
considerations of ‘the economic well-being of the country’. Based on the Court’s own statement in the 
judgement or that of dissenting judges and/or comments found in secondary literature, from the 64 
cases in the dataset where the ECtHR uses its CA formula, 6 can be regarded as either establishing or 
overruling a precedent. 
Generally, the practice of the ECtHR has been to shrink the margin of appreciation in an area 
where there is convergence of national regulatory approaches; au contraire, the Court leaves a broader 
scope of discretion to the national authorities if there is a lack of regulatory similarities.
8
 However, as 
rightly pointed out by Dzehtsiarou,
9
 these broad-brush definitions are hardly comprehensive. While it 
has been convincingly argued that the Court uses CA in order to mediate between the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and evolutive interpretation
10
, it seems that the academic opinion is leaning 
toward the conclusion that consensus is rather embedded in the margin of appreciation doctrine to an 
extent that actually stalls the use of evolutive interpretation. At times the search for consensus is 
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equalised with a minimalist approach advocating a search for a lowest common denominator.
11
 
Furthermore, the use of CA is seen to resemble original intent type of interpretation, coming contrary 
to the development of autonomous concepts by the Court.
12
 Granted, before the adoption of Protocol 
11, the Commission adopted a very cautious approach to comparative and evolutive interpretation. 
However, things have changed a few decades later and as Christoffersen mentions in passing: 
‘Comparative interpretation is a Trojan horse in which evolutive interpretation is hidden’.13  
I argue that a closer and more systematic look at the ECtHR’s use of the method in particular in the 
area of qualified rights and with regards recent case law reveals a pattern - the ECtHR, acting as a 
constitutional court, is using CA in order to gradually develop a new area of law in a progressive 
manner, levelling up the scope of protection. Nowadays the use of majoritarian activism does not 
imply that the Court should wait before all Contracting States adopt a certain legislative provision or 
practice – in Hirst v. UK14 the threshold constituted in slightly more than half of the then members of 
the Council of Europe and in E.B. v. France
15
 the applicant referred to the practices of barely 10 of the 
47 present Council of Europe states. The examined cases show that while the Court has missed several 
opportunities to ascertain precedents in cases where arguably, consensus could be established, it never 
came to reverse a precedent in order to level down the protection.  
III. The Place of Consensus Analysis vis-à-vis Proportionality and Evolutive 
Interpretation 
First, it is important to note that in the sample of precedents from the dataset the ECtHR engages in 
CA either in all the different stages of proportionality, or as a factor that weighs in favour of 
establishing precedent or reversing a previous one on the basis of evolutive interpretation (Table 1, 
infra). In some cases, the ECtHR evokes CA upfront in the judgment in order to define the very scope 
of an article, for instance, in Bayatyan v. Armenia.
16
 CA is not dispositive for the outcome of a case; 
the Court rather uses it to support its proportionality framework or evolutive interpretation. Provided 
that proportionality is the decisive factor, the CA reasoning of the Court is a complementary feature 
that most often hinges on the third stage of proportionality
17
 where according to settled case law, the 
Court examines whether the necessity of a measure corresponds to ‘a pressing need’ in ‘a democratic 
society’. It is in such instances that the defendant government fails to justify the interference with 
rights in view of an overwhelming majority of other states that the Court demonstrates have practices 
or legislation that favour the applicant. This is what can be observed in Bayatyan v. Armenia, Demir 
and Bayakara v. Turkey
18
 and Kiyutin v. Russia.
19
  
The Court has deployed evidence of consensus in order to question the legitimacy of a certain 
policy objective also in the first phase of proportionality in Dickson v. UK.
20
 In Hirst v. UK, the Court 
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demonstrated that certain measures did not satisfy the requirement of attaining a reasonable 
relationship between the means employed and the public objective to be sought (second stage of 
proportionality) as the British policy of a blanket ban to prisoners’ voting rights was in obvious 
disaccord with the majority of European practices (para 74). To the same effect, in Kiyutin v. Russia 
the Court accepted that while a policy of denying residence permits to HIV-positives might be 
considered as having a legitimate aim in terms of ensuring the protection of public health, it was 
disproportionate. Prompted by submissions of the third party, the Court used evidence of both 
legislative and scientific consensus to show that the means used by the government could therefore not 
be justified (para 67). 
IV. Consensus Analyses and the Role of Organised Civil Society  
Once granted the possibility to petition the Court directly, individuals have begun using consensus-
based arguments in support of their claims, and so did the national governments. CA can be employed 
on the Court’s own initiative, or is found (usually in support of the plaintiff) in comparative law 
material submitted by third parties to the proceedings in their amici curiae briefs, or sometimes in 
reports of the Council of Europe expert organ – the Venice Commission. The examined cases show 
that transnational NGOs and human rights organisations such as Liberty, Interights, the AIRE centre, 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have been generally active in litigation as third 
parties across a wide array of Convention articles, while other representatives of civil society such as 
the European Region of the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA-Europe), the European 
Roma Rights Centre or Prison Reform Trust have mobilised support in particular for the development 
of minority rights.
21
 Non-state interveners have sought to demonstrate the broader implications of a 
case by supplying contextual and factual information beyond the one presented by the parties. Such 
contextual information has on a regular basis included the state of law in European states as well as 
internationally, statistics and other evidence of scientific consensus when relevant to the case
22
.  
Research on NGO involvement before the ECtHR the cases in which organised representatives of 
civil society chose to intervene were usually of high importance, changing the direction of the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law23. The extent to which NGOs and human rights organisations, especially 
when cross-border, can be considered as representative of some segment of the ‘public interest’ of 
Europeans constitutes a topic for a different discussion, and possibly a longer one. Suffice to say here 
that the Court has been responsive to the arguments brought by such non-state third parties, sometimes 
quoting the CA presented by them directly in precedents – as for instance, the submission of Liberty in 
Christine Goodwin v. UK. Moreover, in the sample of examined cases it appears that the Court is more 
likely to establish or override its own precedents when transnational actors are also inclined to such 
developments.
24
 Conversely, the ECHR has hesitated to do so and has preserved the status quo in 
cases where the amici briefs significantly diverge.
25
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Table 1: The Rule of Reason in CA cases establishing or overruling precedent
26
 
Precedents  CA evoked by 
applicant (A) 
CA evoked by 
defendant (D) 
Support 
evoked by third 
parties for (A) 
Support 
evoked by 
third parties 
for (D) 
CA in 
reasoning 
of the 
Court 
Evolutive 
interpreta
tion 
Proportion
ality 
Number of 
MS in favour 
of applicant 
 
E.B. v France 
 
X X X - - 2 1 10/47 
 
Christine Goodwin v 
the UK 
 
X X X - 2 1 - 33/43 
 
Hirst v the United 
Kingdom 
 
X X X X 2 2 1 32/45 
 
Dickson v UK 
 
X X - - 2 - 1 ≈25/47* 
 
Bayatyan v Armenia 
 
X X X - 1 1 2 42/47 
Kiyutin v Russia 
 
- - X - 2 - 1 37/47 
 
Demir and Bayakara v 
Turkey  
- - - - 1 1 2 ≈25/47* 
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V. Consensus Analysis through the Lens of Constitutional Adjudication 
The Goodwin decision clearly shows the priority given by the Court to its constitutional functions 
contrasted with its mission to provide individual justice. While the two functions of the Court are 
inseparable as much as individual petitions activate the judicial machinery of the Convention, the 
attempt of the Court to develop the law as society progresses can be seen against the backdrop of its 
endeavours to ensure the smooth functioning of a constitutional system. In a chain of judgments 
preceding Christine Goodwin, the Strasbourg Court interpreted the absence of societal, scientific and 
legislative consensus with regards the legal recognition of post-operative transgender status to mean 
that Article 8 did not impose any positive obligations on national authorities in this respect. However, 
the Court had been signalling to the national governments that in view of changing societal 
perceptions, domestic changes would be needed. Since the UK did not take any action in this 
direction, in Christine Goodwin the Court reversed its previous case law [para 92].  
The case can be contrasted to Schalk and Kopf v Austria,
27
 in which the applicants, a same-sex 
couple, were denied the possibility to marry or have their relationship otherwise recognised by law. 
Since the filing of the application in 2010, Austria amended its legislation, adopting the Registered 
Partnership Act that allowed for the first time same-sex couples to obtain a legal status similar to 
marriage. Even though, prompted by the fact that gay marriages were still supported by a small 
minority of states, the Court kept the margin of appreciation in this area wide, it put an emphasis on 
the evolving nature of the rights to be read under Article 8 and 12, thereby undoubtedly triggering the 
legislative updates made by the Austrian government. 
It is difficult to speculate whether had the Court not heeded the state of consensus, it would have 
reached the same conclusion – violation of Articles 8 and 12, some fifteen years ago before the 
Christine Goodwin case. It seems fair to say that if a majority of states are yet to be in the vanguard of 
legislative developments, the approach adopted by the ECtHR – to allow the governments some time 
for adjustment before changing the direction of case law, gives expression of the Convention as an 
instrument of constitutional adjudication rather than as a vehicle exclusively conductive to the 
inducement of individual justice.  
VI. Prolegomena to a Normative Conceptualisation of Majoritarian Activism 
The case law on qualified rights shows that CA in the reasoning of the Court has been incremental – 
plaintiffs and defendant governments, as well as intervening in the proceedings civil society 
organisations have embraced the logic of the ECtHR recurring to the search for consensus more in the 
past years. However, before considering any procedural deficiencies in the Court’s use of CA and 
reflecting on possible principled modes of application, it is reasonable to first examine the utility of 
CA as a tool of constitutional adjudication.  
In theorising the relation between law and politics, Post is questioning the common 
conceptualisation of a strict dividing line between the two
28. Following Post, ‘we invoke law when we 
believe that we have reached agreement – or when we wish to act as if we had reached agreement – 
and when we wish to implement and entrench our putative agreement’29. The reality is far more 
complex though as often disagreement in societies persists despite enactment or not of legislation and 
conflicting judicial interpretations are ultimately resolved only through the institute of the vote. 
Coming back to the way precedents are formed at the ECtHR, the question is whether putative 
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agreement in a majority of European states can be interpreted as a weighty argument in favour of 
putative agreement on a European scale.  
Substantive Aspects 
The purpose of majoritarian activism is described by some of the Court’s judges as follows: ‘…one of 
the Court’s tasks is precisely to contribute to harmonising across Europe the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention...’ (S.H. and others v Austria, JJ Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska, and Tsotsoria, 
dissenting, para 10). The Court’s harmonising role in the area of fundamental rights is directly linked 
to its constitutional function and self-understanding as a court whose mission is, in co-operation with 
the national constitutional courts of European states, the CJEU, as well as with European civil society 
at large, to participate in an effort dating as far back as the end of the Second World War, and 
connected to forging a layer of European trans-national constitutional identity. The idea of an 
overlapping consensus of John Rawls
30
 is helpful here. For Rawls, ‘a class of liberal conceptions that 
vary within a certain more or less narrow range’ and ‘compete with one another’ form the basis of an 
overlapping consensus that does not destroy plurality but is necessary to enable governance in highly 
heterogeneous societies.
31
 The agreement on fundamentals enshrined in the Convention
32
 is therefore 
periodically re-examined and recalibrated in light of present-day conditions, allowing for the 
emergence of (albeit a volatile), shared European constitutional common ground. To borrow Weiler’s 
note on the direct effect and supremacy of EU law in the context of extracting a legally binding 
character for CA at the ECtHR:  
It is a remarkable instance of Constitutional Tolerance to accept to be bound by a decision not by 
‘my people’ but by a majority among peoples which are precisely not mine...
33
  
The most obvious objection to a conceptualisation of majoritarian activism in a constructivist manner 
is that the Court is not primarily interested in European (legal) developments. While it is true that 
often the ECtHR searches for consensus beyond the Contracting Parties, such referrals point to a 
certain unconditional openness in the approach of the Court to developments beyond Europe. This 
kind of openness forms part of a properly European understanding of constitutionalism that differs, for 
instance, from the reluctant or at least highly disputed use of international law sources by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
34
 
The harmonising feature of the Strasbourg Court’s case law should not be mistaken with an effort 
to establish value hegemony of sorts. In the judges’ words: ‘…The harmonising role, however, has 
limits …the Court may consider that States, owing to the absence of a European consensus, have a 
(not unlimited) margin of appreciation to themselves balance the rights and interests at stake’ (A.B.C. v 
Ireland, JJ Rozakis, Tulkens, Rura, Hirvelä, Malinverni, and Poalelungi, dissenting, para 5). As 
pointed out by Gertensberg and Sabel, ‘authority in the European and international constitutional 
system involves no formal super-or subordination of legal sources and remains horizontal in 
character’35. Since there is no subordination of legal sources, ‘uploaded’ at the supranational level 
standards become anew sources of law that are later ‘downloaded’ by the Contracting States in a 
variety of unrelated ways before (partly) being taken up for ‘upload’ again in a process of continuous 
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cross-fertilisation. It is this deliberative aspect of majoritarian activism at the ECtHR that explains the 
perpetual dialogical node between the Court and the national (legal) constituencies, as well as between 
the Court and mobilised through third party submissions civil society representatives. 
Procedural Aspects 
One of the main procedural problems with majoritarian activism is that it needs to be reconciled with 
legal certainty and the principle of legitimate expectations. For Jeremy Waldron, ‘If consensus was to 
function normatively, it had to be less than complete (so that it guided someone's choices). But 
incomplete consensus required choices to be made, and those choices would necessarily be guided by 
a sense of justice.’36 Clearly, the ECtHR does not and should not understand consensus as unanimity, 
which is why consensus is, in the Strasbourg Court’s vernacular, best viewed as a trend. What is the 
number of states that constitute a trend? Since the CA of the Court is broader than simply applying a 
comparative method and encompasses legislative, judicial but also scientific and societal trends, a 
simple count of states looks untenable. Then how to avoid accusations of cherry-picking or to pick up 
the quote of Justice Scalia’s famous dissent in a case of the U.S. Supreme Court – Roper v Simmons,37 
– how to be sure that CA is not simply when courts ‘look over the heads of the crowd and pick out … 
friends’? In common law systems, but also increasingly so in international law regimes that to some 
extent rely on the principle of stare decisis, the judiciary needs to decide which is the relevant 
precedent to be applied to a case and therefore enjoys a certain discretion in ‘picking’ one precedent 
over another. When the ECtHR has used CA as argumentation that supports the ‘necessity’ or 
sometimes, the ‘legitimate aim’ phase of proportionality as shown above, it can be accepted that the 
proportionality framework is Waldron’s ‘sense of justice’ by which the Court is ultimately guided. In 
this perspective, CA is not determining the outcome of a case but is relevant as additional 
consideration, and can be viewed as the presentation of best practices and as a springboard for the 
Court to ascertain its own autonomous interpretation. However, the ECtHR has also used CA to define 
the ambit of an article and has reversed precedents on the basis of evolutive interpretation, 
demonstrating consensus to be the main reason for change in the direction of the case law. When the 
ratio decidendi is tilted toward evolutive interpretation, should it be necessary that the Court reverses 
or establishes a precedent only when faced with a truly overwhelming majority of states whose 
practices converge? I cannot find any reason why this should be the case. Treating the Convention as a 
‘living instrument’ has made the Court’s judgments authoritative in accordance with social mores at 
the time of delivery implying that a change in science or ethics presupposes a change in case law, 
precisely for reasons of preserving legal certainty and the continuity of the case law. In this 
understanding, CA does not equal evolutive interpretation although it often triggers it. If the ECtHR is 
able to identify and support with factual evidence a trend, the need for evolutive interpretation is 
activated, and the burden of proof shifts to the government that is in minority. A failure by the 
government to provide compelling reasons for upholding the policy in question should signify that the 
Court finds a violation of the Convention. For instance, the Court might identify such compelling 
reasons in an on-going legislative reform that provides for a certain compromise to be reached, e.g. a 
temporary ban on voting rights imposed on a limited category of prisoners in limited circumstances 
that replaces a blanket voting rights prohibition. In the examined precedents in the area of qualified 
rights, the Court has used this logic with at least some degree of consistency. However, the house of 
cards falls apart in S.H. and others v Austria and in A.B.C. v Ireland – despite that the governments in 
minority did not provide compelling reasons in order to defend the challenged policies, the Court 
preferred to uphold the status quo..  
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VII. Conclusion 
Recourse to majoritarian activism is most significant in developing a new area of law – where the 
courts break new ground, often by establishing or overruling a precedent. In the paper a commonly 
held view is questioned – that CA is but another word for deference and judicial minimalism at the 
ECtHR. The data corroborate that in the area of qualified rights after the adoption of Protocol 11, the 
ECtHR, often helped by the submissions of non-state third parties, has used CA as a fact bearing on 
the merits of a case. The Strasbourg Court has usually deployed CA against Contracting States whose 
practices stray away from progressive tendencies in the rest of the Contracting States. This has enabled 
the Strasbourg Court to deal with lacunae in the law that seem inevitable, especially given the 
especially cumbersome amendment process of the Convention. Perhaps best seen against the backdrop 
of a process of a continuous cross-fertilisation between diverse judicial legal orders in Europe, 
majoritarian activism can contribute to a gradual construction of a layer of European constitutional 
identity beyond the nation state.  
Importantly, the very grammar of human rights and CA are in a paradoxical relationship – as 
known, the point of human rights is to isolate a sphere of private autonomy from political and social 
majoritarianism. However, the two European supranational courts engage in CA in a collaborative 
process able to delineate a shared sphere of autonomy granted to Europeans from domestic consensus. 
Majoritarian activism offers an opportunity for the Strasbourg Court to work out the modalities of a 
principled implementation of its highly criticised margin of appreciation doctrine. Regrettably, in 
A.B.C. v Ireland and S.H. and others v Austria where a clear majority of states have the opposite 
standard to that of the defendant government and one expects to find the defendant enjoying a narrow 
margin of discretion, the Strasbourg judges have hidden behind an incomprehensible referral to the 
margin of appreciation. The ECtHR could be a lot more consistent also when applying CA with 
regards, in particular, to the criteria and reach of the burden of proof required from a state in a 
minority position.  
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La formulation des interprétations par la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne 
Jérôme Porta* 
The European legal system is confronted with a typical difficulty: how to guarantee that a legal 
statement be implemented in a similar way by different authorities in charge of his implementation, 
and first of all the judges? The difficulty is not unknown by the national legal systems. But the 
European context of pluralism increases this difficulty. To this difficulty, the European Union legal 
system has a remedy in a procedure, the reference for a preliminary ruling, allowing the national judge 
to question the Court about the validity of a text of the European Union or on its interpretation. 
Through this procedure, it is possible to understand how the European Law deals with this paradoxical 
command to guarantee the unity of the rule, but to allow the specificity of national applications. 
Initially, the answer to this question seemed simple. It is the European judge's capacity to give the 
national judge, the necessary elements in order to solve the disagreement submitted to him. The 
cooperation between the national judge and the European judge is thus founded on a separation of the 
tasks between interpretation and application of the European statement.  
To understand this evolution of the division of competences between the European Court of Justice 
and the national judge within this procedure and the needs of the uniform application for the European 
union legal system, one must be careful about the interpretation practices of the Court of Justice within 
the frame of the preliminary ruling decisions. How does the Court interpret the European texts? But 
being successful in carrying on such a research doesn’t invite coming back to the question of the 
justifications by the Court of justice and its interpretation choices, but to further analyze the textual 
formulation of these interpretations. Therefore, the richness and sophistication of the interpretation 
techniques of the Court of Justice surprise us. Initially, the interpretations formulated by the Court of 
Justice appear mainly to have an abstract form.  
But the dispute about interpretation has gradually lost its abstraction in front of the Court of justice. 
From its origins, the difficulty of the division of tasks founded upon the opposition of application and 
interpretation had been noticed. The segmentation of the judicial decision into two distinct stages, one 
consisting in the interpretation of the rule, the other in the application with a factual context, misjudges 
the nature of the judicial act interpretation. Far from being limited to the abstract interpretation 
formula, founded on the common accepted idea of the role of judicial interpretation, the Court appears 
to be tempted to go from the general rule to its individual applications by a contextualization of his 
own interpretations.  
I. Introduction 
Le système juridique européen est confronté à une difficulté classique: comment garantir qu'un énoncé 
juridique signifiant une norme soit mis en œuvre de manière équivalente par les différentes autorités 
en charge de son application, au premier rang desquelles les juges? La difficulté n'est pas inconnue des 
droits nationaux. Contre de telles divergences dans la mise en œuvre de ses normes, le droit français 
connaît ainsi une institution habilitée à poser l'interprétation authentique d'un texte juridique et plus 
largement à sanctionner la rectitude de ses applications par les juges judiciaires: au nom de l'égalité 
devant la loi, la Cour de cassation est ainsi garante de l'application uniforme.  
Toutefois, cette tension inhérente à l'idée même de norme juridique trouve dans le droit de l'Union 
européenne un lieu d'épreuve exacerbé. En effet, le droit de l'Union européenne se réalise dans un 
contexte juridique caractérisé par une double contrainte pluraliste. Pluralisme des droits nationaux 
d'une part. En l'absence de sémantique commune, les textes européens sont écartelés entre les 
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différents contextes juridiques nationaux susceptibles de justifier autant de lectures concurrentes du 
texte censément commun. Pluralisme des ordres juridictionnels d'autre part. Le juge national est le 
juge de droit commun du droit communautaire. Le droit de l'Union est dépendant des ordres 
juridictionnels des États membres pour sa propre réalisation. Les effets de cette fragmentation 
juridictionnelle sont accentués par l'absence de hiérarchie entre la Cour de justice et le juge national
1
. 
A la différence de la Cour de cassation par exemple, la Cour de justice n'a pas la faculté de censurer 
les décisions des juges nationaux. La seule ressource du juge européen pour garantir l'application 
uniforme des textes européens est alors celle de l'influence et de la coopération entre juridictions. 
A cette difficulté, le droit de l'Union européenne a cherché remède dans la mise en place d'une 
procédure dite de question préjudicielle qui permet au juge national d'interroger la Cour sur la validité 
d'un texte de l'Union ou sur son interprétation
2
. En l'absence de lien hiérarchique entre juge national et 
juge européen, elle ouvre à une procédure coopérative entre les juges pour l'édification du sens 
commun(autaire)
3
. A travers cette procédure, il est possible de saisir comment le droit communautaire 
s’accommode de cet impératif paradoxal: garantir l'uniformité du droit, mais permettre la particularité 
des applications nationales. Initialement, la réponse à cette question passait pour simple.  
Au juge européen incombe la fonction de fournir au juge national les éléments nécessaires pour 
qu'il puisse trancher le litige qui lui est soumis. La coopération entre juge national et juge européen est 
ainsi fondée sur un partage des fonctions. D'un côté, le juge européen doit « dire pour droit » en se 
prononçant sur l'interprétation du texte européen, de l'autre, le juge doit trancher le litige. Ce partage 
repose ainsi sur un découpage fonctionnel classique, distinguant interprétation et application comme 
deux opérations successivement en jeu dans l'acte de juger. Implicitement, ce partage prend racine 
dans une conception classique de l'interprétation, assimilant celle-ci à « la définition du sens d'une 
disposition lorsque le sens et l'objectif ne sont pas clairs »
4
. 
Suivant cette conception, le juge européen ne saurait connaître du litige, mais est seulement 
compétent pour donner une interprétation générale et abstraite de l'énoncé juridique en jeu dans le 
procès. C'est donc logiquement que, dans un arrêt Sagoil
5
, la Cour de justice affirmait clairement qu'il 
ne lui appartenait pas de connaître des faits de l'espèce dans le cadre d'une question préjudicielle.  
Toutefois, ce partage a priori évident devait être remis en cause au nom de l'objectif même de la 
question préjudicielle, garantir l'application uniforme du droit européen. De manière remarquable, le 
souci de rendre une interprétation « utile » pour l'application du droit communautaire a justifié la 
progressive subversion de ce partage initial. 
Pour saisir cette évolution du partage des fonctions dans la procédure préjudicielle et 
corrélativement l'affirmation d'une idée de l'application uniforme propre au droit de l'Union, il importe 
de prêter attention aux pratiques d'interprétation de la Cour de justice dans le cadre des arrêts 
préjudiciels. Comment la Cour interprète-t-elle les textes européens? Mais mener à bien une telle 
étude invite non pas à revenir sur la question connue des justifications par la Cour de ses choix 
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d'interprétation
6
, mais davantage à analyser la formulation de ces interprétations. En effet, la rédaction 
des énoncés interprétatifs révèle par contraste tout à la fois la marge d'appréciation du juge national et 
la portée de l'exigence d'application uniforme dans la mise en œuvre des textes européens. Or ici, la 
richesse et la sophistication des techniques d'interprétation de la Cour de justice surprennent. Loin de 
se limiter à la formulation d'interprétations abstraites, conformes à l'idée communément admise du 
rôle de l'interprétation juridique, la Cour paraît bien tenter de rapprocher la norme générale de ses 
applications particulières, par une contextualisation forte des interprétations qu'elle rend.  
II. La formulation des interprétations abstraites 
Initialement, les interprétations formulées par la Cour de justice ont paru exclusivement devoir prendre 
une forme abstraite. Deux caractères justifient cette qualification. 
D'une part, elles étaient abstraites du litige national. La question préjudicielle doit résoudre un 
désaccord sur l'interprétation d'un texte européen. A cette fin, la Cour organise l'expression de ce 
conflit d'interprétations. Toutefois, ce conflit d'interprétations ne se confond pas avec le litige soumis 
au juge national. Tout d'abord, la procédure préjudicielle est étrangère à l'initiative des parties. Ces 
dernières sont seulement invitées à se faire entendre. Autrement dit, lors de la question préjudicielle, le 
principe du contradictoire n'ordonne plus l'intervention des parties. Surtout, l'expression des 
divergences d'interprétations est ouverte à d'autres parties prenantes: États Membres, institutions 
européennes, sous la synthèse de l'avocat général peuvent intervenir devant la Cour de justice
7
. D'autre 
part, l'interprétation consiste à décider du sens général de la norme. Pratiquement, cela revient pour la 
Cour de justice à procéder à une « reformulation », une « redite » qui ajoute ou retranche à l'énoncé 
juridique. L'acte d'interprétation est alors tenu pour équivalent de l'énoncé initial. Sa formulation se 
veut alors « abstraite » de son contexte d’énonciation, prenant une forme analogue à celle d’une règle 
communautaire. Paradoxe de l'interprétation, l'énoncé interprétatif, censé signifié à l'identique de 
l'original, n'a évidemment d'intérêt que s'il signifie autrement. Quelles sont les techniques de 
formulation des énoncés interprétatifs correspondant à cette conception de la question préjudicielle? 
Tout d'abord, l'énoncé peut se limiter à décider la solution du conflit d'interprétations en débat dans 
le procès. Quand – notamment en raison de la diversité des versions linguistiques – plusieurs 
interprétations sont disputées, le juge européen peut trancher en faveur de l'une d'elles ou même en 
fonction d'une tierce option encore. Par exemple, la version néerlandaise de « diens echtgenote » 
visant l'épouse du travailleur dans le règlement européen sur la coordination des régimes de protection 
sociale s'écartait ici des autres versions nationales qui avaient opté pour le terme non sexo-spécifique 
de « conjoint ». Dans cette hypothèse, la Cour de justice s'est limitée à reformuler le texte originel en 
un énoncé non-sexospécifique, substituant au terme sexué un autre sans indication du genre
8
. Cette 
stratégie de formulation de l'interprétation uniforme présente d'évidentes limites. Elle laisse largement 
ouverte la possibilité d'autres conflits d'interprétations sur le même texte. Qu'en est-il, par exemple, de 
la nature du lien entre conjoints? Doit-il nécessairement s'agir d'un lien marital ou d'autres catégories 
de relations peuvent-elles être accueillies sous ce vocable? 
Afin de conjurer plus largement ces divergences et de suppléer l’absence d’un lexique commun, le 
juge européen peut viser une deuxième stratégie en imposant une définition uniforme
9
. En l'absence de 
                                                     
6
 On retrouverait ici la question connue de la prévalence des interprétations finalistes en droit communautaire, not., P. 
Pescatore, Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principes d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la 
Cour de justice. Contribution à la doctrine de l’interprétation téléologique des traités internationaux, Mélanges Ganshof 
van der Meersch, II, p. 325. 
7
 Article 23 du Protocole n° 3 sur le statut de la Cour de justice de L'Union européenne. 
8
 CJCE 12 juillet 1979, Koschniske / Raad van Arbeid, aff. 9/79, Rec. p. 2717 ; P. Braselmann, Über nationales Recht und 
Mehrsprachigkeit. Linguistische überlegungen zu Sprachproblemen in EuGH-Urteilen, EuR 1992, p. 55. 
9
 C. Wolmark, La définition prétorienne, LGDJ, 2007. 
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sémantique commune aux droits nationaux, la formulation de définition – tant par le juge que par le 
législateur – permet de fixer de manière autonome, c'est-à-dire indépendamment des lexiques 
nationaux, le sens des termes utilisés dans un texte européen. Le recours à des définitions prétoriennes 
dans les arrêts préjudiciels à d'évidence une double fonction, justificative et prescriptive: justificative, 
puisque l'énonciation de la définition, s'imposant généralement au nom du sens commun, offre un 
fondement à la solution du conflit d'interprétations en l'espèce soumis à la Cour; prescriptive, 
puisqu'elle confère aux conflits d'interprétations à venir sur le même terme un cadre sémantique plus 
contraint. En énonçant une définition, la Cour peut tenter de dépasser le règlement du seul conflit 
d’interprétations qui lui est soumis et restreindre les difficultés d’interprétation d’un terme. Pour ce 
faire, elle déplace en quelque sorte le lieu des conflits à venir sur le sens de la notion. Ceux-ci 
porteront désormais non plus sur un vocable esseulé, mais sur le texte de la définition. La Cour impose 
ainsi un cadre textuel au travail d’interprétation, puisque les débats d’interprétation prendront pour 
support les différents éléments de la définition
10
. Ce put être la stratégie de la Cour de justice par 
exemple à propos de la notion d'entreprise pour la mise en œuvre de la directive 77/187 relative au 
maintien des droits des travailleurs en cas de transfert d'entreprise
11
, ou encore du terme de 
« travailleur »
12
, clé du champ d'application personnelle de la liberté de circulation des travailleurs en 
posant une définition de ces derniers.  
Néanmoins chacune de ces illustrations en témoignent. Les techniques de formulation abstraite ne 
suffisent pas à satisfaire aux exigences européennes d'application uniforme. Actes de langage, elles 
demeurent prises dans le cycle des interprétations ouvert à chaque contentieux non seulement en 
raison de l'indétermination sémantique de l'énoncé juridique, mais aussi de l'indétermination 
pragmatique a priori des actes de langages: l'application, en tant que passage du général au particulier 
requiert lui-même de donner une signification contextuée à l'énoncé abstrait d'une règle. Pour encadrer 
la marge d'appréciation des juges nationaux lors de ce passage du général au particulier propre à la 
réalisation de la règle, le juge européen déploie un second genre de stratégies orientées cette fois vers 
le contexte d'application.  
III. La tentation de la contextualisation des interprétations 
Le conflit d'interprétation a progressivement perdu de son abstraction devant la Cour de justice. Dès 
l’origine, la difficulté d’un partage des compétences fondées sur l’opposition de l’application et de 
l’interprétation avait été relevée13. En effet, la segmentation de la décision judiciaire en deux phases 
distinctes, l’une consistant à dire le droit en l’interprétant, l’autre à l’appliquer à une situation 
factuelle, méconnaît la nature de l’acte d’interprétation juridique. Hans Kelsen le rappelait en une 
synthétique formule: « Toutes les normes juridiques appellent une interprétation en tant qu’elles 
doivent être appliquées »
14. Or, ce constat est riche d’un double enseignement, utile pour comprendre 
les pratiques d’interprétation mises en œuvre par la Cour de justice. L'interprétation juridique n'a pas 
seulement une fonction résiduelle de clarification des textes obscurs. D’une part, que telle ait été ou 
non l’intention du « législateur », l’énoncé juridique laisse une marge d’appréciation à l’autorité 
                                                     
10
 C. Wolmark, La définition prétorienne, préc. p. 122 et 157. 
11
 CJCE 11 mars 1997, aff. C-13/95, Rec. p. I-1259, Dr. soc. 1997, p. 728. 
12
 CJCE 3 juillet 1986, Lawrie Blum, aff. 66/85, Rec. p. 2121. 
13
 Sur ce point, R. Kovar, Recours préjudiciel en interprétation et en appréciation de validité - Examen de la question 
préjudicielle par la Cour de justice, Juris-Cl. Europe, 1991, fasc. 361, § 13-15. L’on exposait fort justement, que « la 
compétence pour interpréter suppose la compétence pour décider ce qu’est « interpréter » « (Green, Political integration 
by jurisprudence. The work of the Court of Justice of the european Communities in european political inegration, Sijthoff 
Lyden, 1969, p. 104; cité par R. Kovar, préc.). 
14
 Hans Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit, Paris Bruxelles, LGDJ Bruylant, 1999, trad. par C. Eisenmann, p. 454.  
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d’application15. Celle-ci doit nécessairement procéder à l’interprétation, afin de choisir entre les 
différentes possibilités que laisse ouvertes l’énoncé juridique. D’autre part, l’interprétation juridique 
ne peut pas être comprise comme une sorte d’acte gratuit. L’interprétation juridique a pour objet 
d’éclairer la décision d’application. C’est en vue de l’application qu’est mené le travail 
d’interprétation. Dès lors, indissociable du projet d’application, elle ne peut être abstraite du contexte 
particulier d’application d’un énoncé juridique. Cette imbrication de l’interprétation et de l’application 
trouve un clair écho dans la préoccupation constamment manifestée par la Cour de justice d’offrir une 
« interprétation utile » du droit communautaire
16
. A ce titre, elle réclame désormais du juge national de 
l'informer du contexte juridique et factuel dans lequel se pose ce conflit d'interprétation
17
. L'enjeu est 
alors non pas de donner une interprétation abstraite de la norme européenne, mais une interprétation 
utile adaptée à l'application particulière que le juge national devra donner de la norme européenne 
dans le cadre du litige dont il est saisi. Corrélativement, la Cour de justice a rapidement fait évoluer le 
style de ses formulations interprétatives de manière à les contextualiser pour informer les décisions du 
juge national où se lie nécessairement le passage de la généralité de la règle à son application 
particulière dans un contentieux. Deux voies peuvent alors être suivies par le juge européen, soit vers 
l'aval, en informant sur les règles d'usage de la règle en vue de son application, soit vers l'amont, en 
spécifiant les raisons sensées guider/justifier un choix d'interprétation.  
Vers l'aval 
L'application par le juge d'une règle juridique dans le cadre du procès est une décision complexe, qui 
ne se limite pas à la seule mise en œuvre d'un syllogisme18. Cette décision implique une succession de 
décisions préalables concernant la mise en rapport de la norme à une situation factuelle: choix de la 
règle applicable et décision sur ces conditions d'applicabilité, décisions sur son efficacité juridique 
(effet direct, primauté, etc...), qualification de la situation juridique, etc. Ces différentes décisions, 
prises en vue de l'application de la règle, requièrent des interprétations spécifiques de la norme 
européenne
19
. Aussi, pour chacune de ces décisions peuvent surgir des divergences entre juges 
nationaux, peu important l'accord sur la signification abstraite de la norme commune. Deux techniques 
de formulation des interprétations, parmi d'autres, sont ici aisément repérables. 
En premier lieu, le choix de la règle applicable au litige peut devenir un obstacle à l'application 
uniforme du droit de l'Union. Dès lors qu'un juge national ignore la règle commune, celle-ci risque de 
voir sa pleine application entravée. Le droit communautaire est ici singulièrement dépendant de la 
mobilisation de la règle par les plaideurs et/ou de l'aptitude du juge à relever d'office son application. 
Prises entre ces deux contraintes, la Cour de justice n'hésite toutefois pas à reformuler la question 
préjudicielle que lui adresse le juge national. Ainsi, l’exigence d’utilité de l’interprétation donnée 
conduit la Cour de justice à ne pas être le récepteur seulement passif des questionnements du juge 
national. Les fonctions de cette reformulation sont multiples. Il peut bien évidemment s'agir de simples 
reprises sous une forme plus synthétique de la question adressée par le juge national. Toutefois, cette 
œuvre de reformulation embrasse parfois de plus larges enjeux. Le juge européen peut à cette occasion 
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 M. Troper, Philosophie du droit, préc., p. 98 et ss. 
16
 CJCE 30 juin 1966, Société Technique Minière / Maschinenbau Ulm, aff. 56/65, Rec. p. 337 ; la Cour souligne en 
l’espèce « la nécessité de parvenir à une interprétation utile des textes litigieux ». 
17
 La Cour estime, par exemple, qu’« à défaut d’informations précises relatives aux objectifs, à la nature et aux modalités de 
perception de la contribution litigieuse, il y a lieu de préciser que, dans l’exercice des pouvoirs conférés par l’article 177, 
la Cour devant se borner à donner une interprétation des dispositions en cause du droit communautaire, ne peut apprécier 
les actes juridiques et les dispositions le droit national, au risque que la réponse ne corresponde qu’imparfaitement aux 
particularités de l’espèce » (CJCE 19 juin 1973, Capolongo, aff. 77/72, Rec. p. 611).  
18
 Le constat est classique, not. H. Motulsky, Principes d’une réalisation méthodique du droit privé. La théorie des éléments 
générateurs de droits subjectifs, Sirey 1948, Paris, Dalloz, 3e éd., 2002. 
19
 Il faut par exemple interpréter les dispositions d'une directive pour déterminer si elle est suffisamment précise et 
inconditionnel pour se voir reconnaître un effet direct. 
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« traduire » la question en des termes compatibles avec ses propres compétences afin, dans un esprit 
de coopération, de ne pas avoir à déclarer irrecevable la question du juge national (tel est le cas par 
exemple du juge national qui réclame du juge européen décision sur l'application de la norme 
européenne au cas d'espèce). La Cour n’hésite ainsi pas à « dégager du libellé imparfaitement formulé 
par une juridiction nationale les seules questions relevant de l’interprétation du traité »20. Mais, plus 
encore, ce jeu de la reformulation n’a pas pour seul objet le rappel, par la Cour, des limites de sa 
compétence. Elle peut également, de l’exposé du cadre factuel et légal, faire ressortir une demande 
d’interprétation, celle-ci n’eût-elle pas été posée sous forme de question précise21. Ce pouvoir de 
correction permet à la Cour, en présence de questions formulées de manière impropre ou dépassant le 
cadre des fonctions qui lui sont dévolues, d'extraire de l'ensemble des éléments fournis par la 
juridiction nationale - et notamment de la motivation de l'acte portant renvoi - les éléments de droit 
communautaire qui appellent une interprétation compte tenu de l'objet du litige
22
. La pédagogie du 
procédé mise en œuvre par la Cour de justice oriente nécessairement le juge national. Une telle 
pratique renforce la possibilité d’une compréhension autonome du droit communautaire, quand la 
question préjudicielle, telle que posée par le juge national, dénote souvent une lecture nationale de la 
norme communautaire. C'est souvent avec les mots, les concepts et les problèmes juridiques 
spécifiques au droit interne que le juge national interroge la Cour de justice. Ainsi la formulation de la 
question préjudicielle révèle beaucoup des représentations nationales du droit communautaire. La 
pratique de la reformulation s’apparente à une forme de communautarisation. La Cour traduit dans une 
perspective communautaire ce questionnement juridique qui préside à l’identification de la règle 
applicable. En quelque sorte, elle donne une version communautaire de la situation contentieuse. 
L'enjeu est alors de faire correspondre la difficulté rencontrée par le juge national avec un problème 
juridique propre au droit de l'Union. Cette activité de reformulation indique alors par contraste le coût, 
les déplacements d'objet du litige susceptibles d'être imposés par la mobilisation de la norme 
européenne.  
En deuxième lieu, la formulation de l'interprétation préjudicielle peut informer la décision de 
qualification. Qualifier consiste idéalement « à placer un fait ou un acte juridique sous le concept 
normatif qui en détermine la nature juridique »
23
. Par cette opération, le juge subsume un objet, un fait, 
un acte ou une situation sous des concepts. Dans le partage communautaire entre interprétation et 
application qui ordonne les fonctions respectives des juridictions nationales et du juge communautaire 
dans le cadre d’un renvoi préjudiciel, la décision de qualification est un des éléments de l’application. 
En principe, elle ne peut être l’objet d’une question préjudicielle. La Cour de justice n’hésite pas à le 
rappeler lorsque le juge national retient une formulation par trop concrète de sa demande 
d’interprétation du droit communautaire. La Cour juge, en effet, qu’elle « n’a pas compétence pour 
appliquer la règle communautaire à une espèce déterminée et, partant, pour qualifier une disposition 
du droit national »
24
. De la compétence du juge national, l'opération de qualification semble ainsi 
échapper à l'emprise de la Cour de justice. Ce constat n'accule toutefois pas la Cour au mutisme. 
Indiquant la signification de la norme communautaire sur laquelle elle était interrogée, la Cour peut 
préparer l’opération nationale de qualification25. Certes, la qualification peut parfois s'énoncer comme 
une évidence, sans autre forme de procès. Tel ou tel comportement sera déclaré ou non de fautif. Pour 
encadrer la décision nationale, la Cour peut poser une méthode de qualification. En définitive, c'est 
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 CJCE 15 juillet 1964, Costa / ENEL, aff. 6/64, Rec. p. I-1141. 
21
 CJCE 6 mai 1971, Cadillon / Höss, aff. 1/71, rec. p. 723. 
22
 CJCE 20 mars 1986, Procureur de la République / Tissier, aff. 35/85, Rec. p. I-1207, al. 9. 
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 V° « Qualification », Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit, préc. 
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 CJCE 11 avril 1973, Michel S. / Fonds national de reclassement social des handicapés, aff. 76/72, Rec. p. 457. 
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déjà l'objet d'une définition prétorienne, déjà évoquée, qui détermine les éléments nécessaires à la 
qualification. Mais le juge européen peut plus encore préciser la valeur de ces différents éléments, 
indices ou critères, alternatifs ou cumulatifs,... A la définition ou en sus de celle-ci, la Cour opte 
parfois pour la détermination d'un faisceau d'indices ou encore d'une présomption. A chaque fois, il 
s'agit d'indiquer au juge national – avec plus ou moins de rigueur – les éléments à prendre en compte 
pour la décision de qualification. Plus contraignante pour la décision de qualification et rompant 
davantage encore avec l'abstraction de la norme européenne, la formulation des interprétations donne 
parfois lieu à l'édification d'une véritable casuistique. Cette casuistique peut alors s'incarner dans une 
typologie identifiant des situations modèles pour l'application de la règle européenne
26
. Plus 
fréquemment, cette casuistique s'apparente à une technique d'interprétation proche d'une simple 
monstration. De la même manière que la décision sur le sens d'un mot peut se passer d'une définition 
et se résoudre dans le simple geste de désignation d'un objet du monde, le juge européen peut formuler 
son interprétation en termes précis visant directement le litige devant le juge national. A cette fin et 
montrant la fragilité du partage des fonctions fondé sur la distinction entre interprétation et 
application, la Cour de justice précise le sens du texte européen pour une situation générique analogue 
à celle soumise au juge national. En ce cas la marge d'appréciation du juge national est fortement 
réduite et la ligne de partage entre interprétation et application paraît singulièrement approchée du 
moment de l'application au cas d'espèce par la Cour de justice. 
Vers l'amont 
La formulation de l'interprétation peut informer les raisons justifiant la décision sur les choix 
d’interprétation du droit national conformément au droit de l'Union. Cette stratégie d'interprétation est 
précieuse notamment lorsque l'interprétation du droit national à la lumière d'un acte de droit dérivé 
laisse une marge d'appréciation importante au juge national. Ici le juge européen peut tenter d'encadrer 
l'usage national de cette marge d'appréciation en précisant les raisons devant guider le juge national. 
Deux techniques sont susceptibles d'être sollicitées. 
D'une part, la formulation de l'interprétation procède parfois à un « rappel » de l'objectif poursuivi 
par l'acte européen. Dans les choix d'interprétation et d'application, le juge national pourra alors faire 
référence à cette norme de surplomb pour justifier sa décision. En effet, selon la Cour, il est de 
jurisprudence constante « pour l’interprétation d’une disposition de droit communautaire, de tenir 
compte non seulement des termes de celle-ci, mais également de son contexte et des objectifs 
poursuivis par la réglementation dont elle fait partie »
27. Une telle directive d’interprétation désigne un 
projet fondateur pour l’interprétation du droit communautaire. Un arrêt du 4 juillet 200628, relatif à 
l’interprétation de l’accord-cadre sur le travail à durée déterminée, illustre l’influence de la référence 
aux objectifs de l’acte dans le travail d’interprétation du juge communautaire. En l’espèce, le droit 
national n'est pas jugé conforme au droit de l'Union pour sa méconnaissance la finalité de l’acte 
communautaire, qui est de « protéger les travailleurs contre l’instabilité de l’emploi»29. 
D'autre part, le respect des droits fondamentaux dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du droit de 
l'Union européenne peut avoir une analogue fonction de raréfaction du sens communautaire. 
L’obligation d’interprétation conforme implique, de faire prévaloir une interprétation du droit national, 
adopté pour la transposition d'une directive par exemple, compatible avec les droits fondamentaux. 
Interrogé par le juge national sur la signification d'une directive, la Cour de justice ne se limite pas à 
seulement préciser l’interprétation de cette dernière. Elle estime de sa compétence, de « fournir tous 
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 On pense par exemple ici la complexe jurisprudence de la Cour de justice relative à la détermination du lieu habituel 
d'exécution du contrat de travail pour la détermination de la compétence internationale des juridictions en application du 
Règlement Bruxelles I; par exemple, CJCE 27 février 2002, Herbert Weber, aff. C-37/00.  
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 Notamment, CJCE 14 octobre 1999, Adidas, aff. C-223/98, Rec. p. I-7081, pt. 23. 
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 CJCE 4 juillet 2006, Adeneler, aff. C-212/04, obs. L. Idot, Revue Europe, Octobre 2006, Comm., n° 276, p. 17-18. 
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les éléments d’interprétation nécessaires à l’appréciation, par la juridiction nationale, de la conformité 
[de la] réglementation [nationale] avec les droits fondamentaux dont la Cour assure le respect »
30
. 
Conclusion 
Pour conclure, quels enseignements tirés d'une telle analyse des stratégies de formulation des 
interprétations à l'occasion de la question préjudicielle?  
Concernant plus généralement, l'interprétation juridique prêter attention à la formulation des 
énoncés interprétatifs permet de faire justice d'une vision trop restrictive de la fonction interprétative. 
A l'opposé d'une vision trop communément admise, l'interprétation juridique ne consiste pas seulement 
à redire l'énoncé juridique dans sa généralité
31
. Elle n'est pas que la décision du sens abstrait de 
l'énoncé signifiant une norme. Elle accompagne également les opérations d'application de la norme, 
décidant de la signification et de ses usages possible pour un contexte particulier d'application. Cette 
dimension pragmatique de l'interprétation juridique est trop souvent occultée. Concernant la 
coopération entre le juge européen et les juges nationaux, une telle analyse permet une vue plus 
« réaliste » des contraintes et ressources que peut offrir la procédure préjudicielle au juge national. En 
l'absence de lien hiérarchique, la Cour de justice a su déployer une riche palette de stratégie 
d'influence.  
Enfin, elle donne à mieux comprendre ce que signifie l'exigence d'application uniforme dans le 
cadre de l'intégration européenne. Deux idées fausses peuvent ici être écartées. L'application uniforme 
ne se limite pas à imposer que la signification abstraite de la norme européenne soit commune. Mais 
elle n'impose pas non plus une inatteignable identité des décisions particulières d'application par les 
juges nationaux. Entre ces deux visées, les stratégies de formulation des interprétations invitent à 
repenser l'uniformité attendue du droit de l'Union européenne. Il s'agit alors de mieux saisir comment, 
dans le droit européen, concilie le général de la norme et le particulier de ses applications. Perdant de 
son évidence, l'idée d'application uniforme suggère ici la nécessité d'une plus précise étude des 
conventions d'équivalence implicites par lesquelles il est possible que d'affirmer que, d'un juge 
national à l'autre, d'un procès à un autre, une norme commun(autaire) a été uniformément appliquée. 
La richesse des modes de formulation des interprétations découvre la variabilité possible de ces 
conventions. D'un texte européen à l'autre, l'application uniforme n'exige pas la même rigoureuse 
mesure de l'équivalence. L'analyse est difficile, mais l'enjeu épistémologique d'importance puisqu'il est 
alors dévoiler un peu de ce que « faire jurisprudence » signifie dans le contexte de l'intégration 
européenne.  
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 CJCE 1er février 1996, Procédure pénale contre Perfili, aff. C-177/94, Rec. p. I-161, pt. 20. 
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 P. Pescatore, s’inspirant probablement de son expérience de juge communautaire, estimait que « dans la pratique du droit, 
on réunit sous le nom de l’interprétation l’ensemble des procédés intellectuels qui servent à déterminer et à préciser, dans 
une situation donnée, le principe applicable. En ce sens, interpréter veut dire, bien sûr, élucider un texte obscur, mais 
interpréter veut encore dire: spécifier un texte général (…) ; rectifier les imperfections des textes et adapter ceux-ci aux 
exigences actuelles ; résoudre les contradictions ; étendre les textes de manière à combler les lacunes. En un mot, 
l’interprétation englobe l’ensemble des opérations nécessaires pour rendre les règles de droit susceptibles d’application 
dans le concret. La nécessité d’interpréter résulte donc non seulement des imperfections de la loi, mais de la nature 
intrinsèque des lois comme règles générales » P. Pescatore, Introduction à la science du droit, Luxembourg Office des 
imprimés de l’État, 1960, p. 326 ; cité par F. Ost et M. van de Kerchove, Interprétation, Archives de philosophie du droit, 
1990, p. 165, spéc. 175. 
 53 
The Realisation of the ne bis in idem Principle in the EU 
Bas van Bockel* 
I. Introduction 
There are several factors which shape the ne bis in idem principle in its realization on the European 
level. One factor is found in the various particularities of national ne bis in idem rules which are 
deeply rooted in national constitutional traditions and in national systems of criminal law. These 
particularities, which can in some cases be traced as far back as back to the transition from medieval 
conceptions of the nature of criminal proceedings to the enlightenment and from developments 
concerning the roles of judges and juries in criminal trials, have led to divergent and sometimes 
conflicting approaches to the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle. Another factors is formed 
by the different perspectives the courts of the European Union and the Council of Europe take to the 
role and function of the principle on the European level. After providing some background on the 
development of the ne bis in idem principle, this paper will discuss two different perceptions of that 
principle on the European level which are called here the ‘extradition paradigm’ and the 
‘constitutional paradigm’, and examine how these perceptions have played out in the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights. Both approaches are rooted in 
notions concerning the role and function of the ne bis in idem rule in domestic legal systems. Under 
the constitutional paradigm, the ne bis in idem principle is seen as forming part of an emerging 
European constitutional order, whereas under the extradition paradigm, the principle is primarily seen 
as logical consequence of closer cooperation between European States in enforcement matters. 
Although the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) would appear to have fully aligned its 
interpretation of the element of idem (“the same”) with that of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
there are good indications that their approaches actually diverge significantly in the light of these 
different underlying perceptions of the role of the ne bis in idem principle. The paper concludes that 
the development of the ne bis in idem principle on the European level reveals a dichotomy between 
more state-based and more universalist perceptions of the role of fundamental rights in the process of 
European integration in the case law of the Luxemburg and Strasburg courts.  
II. Background: the ne bis in idem principle 
The principle of ne bis in idem is a fundamental principle of law, which restricts the possibility of a 
defendant being prosecuted repeatedly on the basis of the same offence, act or facts. The principle has 
a long history and exists in many forms in national systems of law. The earliest known reference to the 
ne bis in idem principle originates from approximately 355 BC, when Demosthenes reasoned that ‘the 
laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue’. In common law the principle is known 
as “double jeopardy”, and it is believed that the principle is as old as the common law itself.1 The 
principle featured prominently in the struggle between King Henry II and St. Thomas Beckett in the 
12th century AD. King Henry enacted a series of legislative procedures called The Constitutions of 
Clarendon which amongst other things allowed convicted former clergy men who had been tried 
before ecclesial courts to be further tried and punished before a secular court.
2
 The idea that legal 
proceedings have as their purpose to establish the ‘whole truth’, the so-called the “inquisitory” trial 
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was introduced in Europe by the late 12
th
 century.
3
 The heavy burden of establishing the ‘whole truth’ 
resulted in final judgments being postponed indefinitely by way of judicial decisions under such 
headings as ‘plus amples informes’, absolutio ab instantia, ‘slaking’ or ‘Instanzentbindung’. This state 
of limbo was often accompanied by coercive measures imposed on the subject for an indefinite 
duration. The practice of absolutio ab instantia in various forms was widespread in Europe until the 
second half of the 18
th
 century and led to widespread protests. Amongst other things, the conviction 
that legal proceedings ought to be finite, and that the prosecution should be barred from bringing 
further proceedings after a first trial had ended in an acquittal or conviction featured prominently 
among the ideals of the French Revolution. Thus, a shift in the rules governing the relationship 
between states and their citizens which emanated from the ideals of the enlightenment propelled the ne 
bis in idem rule to legal and constitutional prominence in most jurisdictions in Europe.  
In continental law traditions, a distinction is usually made between the principle’s role as an 
individual right, and it’s function as a guarantee for legal certainty by upholding the finality of judicial 
decisions. In the former sense, the principle protects the individual from possible abuses of the state’s 
ius puniendi. The title of Kafka’s Der Process4 is aptly chosen: Josef K. finds himself at the mercy of 
a legal procedure which carries on indefinitely, and follows its own impenetrable logic. In the latter 
sense, that of the function of the principle as a guarantee for legal certainty by upholding the finality of 
judicial decisions, the principle precisely protects the authority of the judgment as such which forms 
an important precondition for judicial impartiality. The rationale of the principle thus coincide with 
the principal functions of criminal justice: the protection of the individual, and the enforcement of law. 
In most legal systems no other rule than that of ne bis in idem definitely bars the bringing of new 
proceedings in respect of the same act or facts. Even if multiple prosecutions are not abusive on the 
part of the state, additional burdens arising out of the repeated prosecution of a subject ‘include the 
duplicated costs of legal representation, coercive measures to the person and property, and 
psychological burdens associated with the extended procedures and the absence of finality’.5  
III. Elements and Exceptions 
Although many differences in the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle have developed over 
time, the principle generally entails two main substantive elements: bis and idem. The element bis 
refers to the question when it is that a subject is tried twice. This is the case where outcome of the first 
proceedings has acquired finality (res iudicata). A judicial decision is final when it is irrevocable, that 
is to say when no more ordinary remedies are available under the law, where all remedies were 
exhausted, or where the time limit for those remedies has expired. As for the element of idem, it is 
accepted wisdom that there are two possible approaches to the question what must be understood as 
“the same” act or facts: by recourse to the objective historical facts in so far as possible, or by recourse 
to their legal qualification. More factual approaches in practice offer more protection against 
subsequent prosecutions for the subject, whereas more legal approaches leave scope for the authorities 
to pursue a second conviction, either under a different legal heading (“murder” instead of 
“manslaughter”), or by distinguishing between different protected legal interests, or different 
reproaches of guilt.  
The distinction commonly made between “factual” and “legal” approaches to a finding of idem is 
entirely hypothetical. In practice, ne bis in idem rules combine more factual and more juridical 
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approaches where a finding of idem is concerned, and the interplay between the two can be subtle.
6
 
There are considerable differences between national ne bis in idem rules on this point, and procedural 
issues such as whether the earlier prosecution ended in an acquittal or conviction may come into play 
here.
7
 Although in the majority of legal systems which entail a ne bis in idem rule the factual 
circumstances are emphasized in the context of idem, considerations which ultimately go back to the 
legal qualification of the act such as the legal interest at stake or the reproach of guilt often play a 
role.
8
 A comparative analysis of the interpretation of idem in the German, Dutch and French legal 
systems carried out by Van Hattum
9
 reveals that stronger emphasis on the factual circumstances of the 
case have developed in those jurisdictions where there are more formal possibilities for the authorities 
to pursue a second conviction (novum, falsa, or other formal exceptions to the ne bis in idem rule), 
whereas in jurisdictions where such exceptions are not available, the possibility of securing a second 
conviction is secured by way of the ‘solution de dépannage’ of interpreting the element of idem more 
restrictively. Three categories of interpretations of idem can be distinguished in this regard: i.) 
juridical approaches to the finding of idem where a second prosecution is allowed under a different 
legal heading; ii.) approaches in which the reproach of guilt is taken into account (for instance 
distinguishing between negligent, willful, or intentional acts); and: iii.) approaches in which an 
“identity of the protected legal interest” is required. The latter in particular has on occasion produced 
opaque and seemingly random distinctions between various “legal interests”.10 
National ne bis in idem rules do not only play a role situations where both prosecutions originate 
from within the same system of criminal law, but also in situations which arise in connection with an 
extradition request. This latter category is in many ways distinct from the former, and is often laid 
down separately in extradition law. Extradition is a form of cooperation between states, and the 
conditions and procedures for extradition tend to vary from state to state and depend on the applicable 
extradition treaty. Extradition as such is procedurally distinct from the actual trial in which the full bill 
of national procedural and constitutional rights protects the subject, so that a lower level of protection 
for the subject is considered acceptable.
11
 Ne bis in idem rules in the context of extradition often do not 
tend to enjoy the same constitutional status as their constitutional counterparts. At the same time 
however, ne bis in idem protection in the context of extradition is not necessarily lower than within the 
national (constitutional) context. The legal qualification of the act in question is for instance strictly 
speaking never ‘identical’ in extradition situations, so that the historical facts will tend to prevail. Ne 
bis in idem protection in the extradition context can also entail additional conditions such as the 
requirement of enforcement which are not always mirrored by a similar requirement in domestic 
situations.  
                                                     
6
 It is even questionable whether any such thing as a “purely factual” or “purely juridical” approach can exist in the context 
of legal proceedings. 
7
 W.B. van Bockel, ‘The ne bis in idem principle in EU law’, Kluwer Law International (2010), p. 45 
8
 Van Bockel 2010, p. 44 et seq. 
9
 Van Hattum 2011. 
10
 An example is the judgment in Gradinger v. Austria, 23 Oct. 1995 (Appl. No. 15963/90), para. 54 where the interest of 
“traffic regulation” is distinguished from that of “public safety”. It is however difficult to see how traffic regulation 
would serve any other interest than that of public safety. 
11
 Amongst other things, this raises issues where to subject was tried and convicted in absentia so that some additional 
safeguards are found in extradition treaties and national extradition laws on this point. 
Bas van Bockel 
56 
 
IV. European ne bis in idem Rules 
Several ne bis in idem provisions exist within the respective frameworks of the EU and the Council of 
Europe, notably Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (‘4P7 ECHR’), Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (the ‘Charter’), and art. 54 CISA. Ne bis in idem provisions are also found in a 
number of specific instruments, aimed at establishing judicial cooperation in the field of criminal law 
within the EU. Article 3, section 2 of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
(‘FDEAW’) is a provision in EU secondary law which stipulates that the executing judicial authority 
shall refuse to execute the European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’) if the person in question has been finally 
judged in a Member State in respect of the same acts, provided that where a sentence has been 
imposed, the sentence has been served, is being served, or can no longer be served. Article 4 of section 
2 of the FDEAW refers to pending criminal proceedings as an optional ground for refusal of an EAW, 
and section 5 of Article 4 FDEAW allows for optional refusal if the requested person has been finally 
judged by a third State. The main ‘European’ provisions will be briefly introduced below in order to 
provide the necessary background for the analysis of the case law. The provisions read as follows: 
Article 4P7 ECHR 
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of 
the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance 
with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly 
discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could 
affect the outcome of the case. 
Article 50 Charter 
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which 
he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law. 
Article 54 CISA 
A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in 
another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been 
enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of 
the sentencing Contracting Party. 
Article 55 CISA stipulates that the ne bis in idem principle of Article 54 CISA does not apply in 
respect of: i) crimes committed in whole or in part in the territory of the second state to initiate the 
prosecution, ii) crimes affecting the states’ ‘essential interests’, and iii) crimes which have been 
committed by the officials of the (second) state, in the exercise of their duties. A prior declaration is 
however required in order for a Member State to rely on this exception possibility. 
There are numerous differences between the provisions. Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms only offers protection 
against trial or punishment in one and the same state. Article 50 of the Charter contains the same rule, 
but expands its geographical scope of application from the national level to the level of the European 
Union (‘ . . . within the Union’). Article 54 CISA is worded somewhat differently than the other three 
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where it states that it shall apply to any subsequent set of proceedings on the basis of the same facts in 
any other Member State than the one where the first decision was taken, finally disposing of 
someone’s trial.12 Article 4P7 ECHR contains an exception to the ne bis in idem rule allowing for a 
second trial where new or newly discovered facts (novum) or if there has been a ‘fundamental defect 
in the previous proceedings which could affect the outcome of the case’, whereas Article 14(7) ICCPR 
and Article 50 of the Charter do not. According to the Explanatory Report, this includes evidence of 
new or newly discovered evidence, including new means of proof relating to the previously existing 
facts. The Explanatory Report states that Article 4P7 ECHR does not ‘prevent the reopening of the 
proceedings in favor of the convicted person or any changing of the judgment to the benefit of a 
convicted person.’ Unlike art. 54 CISA, article 4P7 ECHR does not require that the penalty imposed 
has been enforced or is actually being enforced. 
In order to understand the relevance of these differences between the provisions it helps to consider 
them in the context of their place and purpose in the EU legal order. Art. 54 CISA forms part of the 
Schengen-acquis, concluded as an intergovernmental instrument between only five Member States. 
The Schengen- acquis aims to establish free circulation of persons by abolishing border checks, but at 
the same time implements ‘countervailing measures’ in the form of the provisions on police 
cooperation, mutual assistance in criminal matters, extradition, transfer and enforcement of judgments, 
and the Schengen Information System (SIS).
13
 Although Article 54 CISA forms an important step for 
the ne bis in idem principle in Europe,
14
 the logic underlying the CISA as a whole is therefore closely 
linked to extradition and enforcement cooperation between (sovereign) states (the extradition 
paradigm). This is not only reflected by the broad exception possibilities laid down in Article 55 CISA 
and the scope of application of the provision (which applies only between the Schengen-states), but 
the wording of Article 54 CISA where it refers to “the same acts” could also be interpreted as a logical 
consequence of this particular function. By contrast, the wording of Articles 4P7 ECHR and 50 of the 
Charter in particular reveals more constitutional ambitions on the part of the draftsmen.
15
 This may be 
evidenced by the broad and sweeping wording of article 50 of the Charter (“within the Union”), as 
well as by the fact that Article 4P7 allows for certain exceptions to the ne bis in idem rule bringing the 
provisions in line with exception possibilities to ne bis in idem rules in national systems of law.  
V. Two Different Perspectives on the Nature and Role of the ne bis in idem Principle 
From the foregoing it follows that two rather different perspectives can be taken in considering the 
realization of the ne bis in idem principle on the European level. The first approach to an extent 
reflects the traditional role of ne bis in idem rules in national extradition procedures which, due to their 
particular function in the extradition context, can sometimes differ in their wording and interpretation 
from constitutional versions of the same rule. There is every reason to assume that such an approach 
comes close to what the draftsmen of the CISA had in mind, and the question is whether the 
incorporation of the Schengen-acquis into that of the EU (now: Title V, Chapter 4 of the TFEU) and 
its association with the mutual recognition principle in EU law has changed anything in this regard. 
This “extradition paradigm” would appeal in particular to lawyers with a background in state 
prosecution such as the Current Advocate General Yves Bot. The extradition paradigm could also, to 
some extent be relied on to justify inconsistencies between the interpretation of Article 54 CISA in the 
case law of the CJEU, and other developments in the case law on ne bis in idem before the Luxemburg 
and Strasburg courts. Under the extradition paradigm, the emphasis is on the more on the practical 
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need for a clear and unambiguous ne bis in idem rule such as Article 54 CISA in the context of judicial 
cooperation, than on the need to develop a coherent and consistent body of fundamental rights on the 
European level. After all, the aim of enhanced cooperation in the EU is after all precisely to do away 
with costly and cumbersome extradition procedures between the Member States. Under the 
constitutional paradigm however, the emphasis precisely shifts towards the need for uniformity in the 
interpretation and application of fundamental rights, whereby the various ne bis in idem provisions in 
existence are seen as (imperfect) expressions a single, overriding fundamental general principle of EU 
law, to be further refined through the case law of the CJEU. As such, Article 54 CISA forms important 
addition to an emerging European constitutional body of fundamental rights and legal principles rather 
than a provision with a specific function in the context of enhanced cooperation. In the words of AG 
Sharpston in her Opinion in the Gasparini case:
16
  
 “For the purposes of EU law, it seems to me almost inevitable that, in consequence, the concept 
of ne bis in idem (which, as the Court noted in Vinyl Maatschappij, is a fundamental principle of 
Community law) is to be understood as a free-standing, or propriae naturae, principle. In the absence 
of further initiatives by way of Treaty amendment or secondary Community legislation, it is therefore 
to be refined and developed by the Court in the exercise of its ‘hermeneutic monopoly’ on such key 
concepts of EU law. The specific application of the principle in particular areas (be these competition 
law or through Article 54 of the CISA) should form part of a core understanding of what that 
fundamental principle means (or ought to mean) within the Community legal order. The proposition 
that ne bis in idem should be understood as a free-standing principle in the context of the EU is not, I 
venture to suggest, too adventurous. The EU constitutes a new legal order and the European 
integration process a unique international construction. For its part, Article 54 of the CISA represents 
one of the first successful attempts to apply the ne bis in idem principle in a multilateral manner in a 
transnational context. It therefore seems natural that the definition of the principle should be propriae 
naturae, adapted to the particular features of the supranational context in which it is to apply.” 
Contrary to the extradition paradigm which implicitly distinguishes Article 54 CISA from other 
European ne bis in idem rules, the constitutional paradigm therefore sets out to draw the various 
European ne bis in idem provisions including Article 4P7 ECHR together in their interpretation and 
application.
17
 It is a small step from there to accepting the most developed of those provisions offering 
the highest level of protection as a benchmark for the interpretation and application of the ne bis in 
idem in other areas of EU law. Before arriving at conclusions concerning the implications of these two 
perceptions of the ne bis in idem rule on the European level, the main developments in the case law of 
the CJEU and the ECtHR will be discussed below. 
VI. The Case-law of the CJEU and the ECtHR on the ne bis in idem Principle 
As regards the case law of the CJEU concerning the ne bis in idem principle, a distinction must be 
made between the cases concerning art 54 CISA and those concerning the ne bis in idem principle as a 
general principle of EU law in competition cases. In competition matters, the Court has formulated a 
“threefold condition” for a finding of idem: the “identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the 
legal interest protected”18 This approach to a finding of idem is therefore not only factual, but co-
depends on an additional ‘identity’: that of the ‘legal interest protected’.19  
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The Court expressly took the other approach in its case law concerning Article 54 CISA. In its 
landmark judgment in the Van Esbroeck case the Court held for the first time that ‘ the relevant 
criterion for the purposes of the application of that article is identity of the material acts, understood as 
the existence of a set of facts which are inextricably linked together, irrespective of the legal 
classification given to them or the legal interest protected’ (italics added).20 The Court reiterated and 
confirmed this in several subsequent judgments
21
 In its considerations, the Court refers to the wording 
of the provision and its purpose within the Schengen-framework, but also to the nature of the ne bis in 
idem principle as a fundamental right: “(t)he wording of Article 54 of the CISA, ‘‘the same acts’’, 
shows that that provision refers only to the nature of the acts in dispute and not to their legal 
classification’ which confirmed by the nature of Article 54 CISA as a fundamental right and its 
purpose within the context of the Schengen-acquis and that the central question is whether a situation 
constitutes a set of facts which are inextricably linked together”. What the Court refers to where it 
refers to “the same acts” is off course the distinction between the term “acts” in art. 54 CISA and the 
term “offence” in arts. 50 of the Charter and 4P7 ECHR.22 
As for the question whether this line of case law is more in line with the extradition paradigm or 
the constitutional paradigm, several observations can be made. The first is that the Court does not 
appear to depart from a “core understanding” of ne bis in idem in EU law (as proposed by AG 
Sharpston) in its interpretation of Aricle 54 CISA. The Court emphasizes the wording of the provision 
which could imply that some differences in interpretation of the various ne bis in idem provisions may 
be acceptable according to their wording and. Perhaps more tellingly, in a recent competition 
judgment (Toshiba) the Court reiterated its “threefold condition”, confirming the existence of two 
different approaches to the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle in EU law. Finally, and 
notwithstanding the fact that the Court also makes mention of the fundamental rights nature of the 
provision, reference is made in the case law to the purpose of Article 54 CISA within the context of 
the Schengen-acquis, rather than to the purpose of the ne bis in idem principle within the legal order of 
the EU as a whole. The approach taken by the CJEU to the interpretation of Article 54 CISA therefore 
appears to be more in line with the extradition paradigm than with the constitutional paradigm.  
The case law of the ECtHR developed along different lines. After the initial vying decisions in 
Gradinger and Oliveira, in which the Court alternated between a legal (Gradinger) and a factual 
(Oliveira) approach, the Court adopted an autonomous approach to the interpretation of ‘the same 
offence’ by taking into account the question whether two or more offences share the same essential 
elements. In practice, this approach not only had the effect of lowering the level of protection 
drastically but also generated much uncertainty.
23
 This line of case law can be taken to exemplify the 
difficulty in establishing a single standard for a ne bis in idem rule on the European level which can 
“break into” national ne bis in idem rules by raising the level of protection afforded by them, whilst 
respecting the diversity of national constitutional ne bis in idem rules in the Member States.  
A turning point came in the Grand Chamber decision in the Zolotukhin case, when the Court 
expressly denounced the earlier case law on this point, and considered that ‘the existence of a variety 
of approaches to ascertaining whether the offence for which an applicant has been prosecuted is 
(Contd.)                                                                  
cannot be assessed in the abstract, but must be examined with reference to the territory, within the Union or outside it, in 
which the conduct in question had such an object or effect, and to the period during which the conduct in question had 
such an object or effect.” 
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indeed the same as the one of which he or she was already finally convicted or acquitted engenders 
legal uncertainty incompatible with a fundamental right’. In the judgment, the Grand Chamber not 
only takes stock of the case law of the CJEU, both in competition matters as well as in the context of 
the CISA, but also of the wording of the American Convention on Human Rights and the case law of 
the U.S Supreme Court. It comes to the conclusion that “the approach which emphasises the legal 
characterisation of the two offences is too restrictive on the rights of the individual, for if the Court 
limits itself to finding that the person was prosecuted for offences having a different legal 
classification it risks undermining the guarantee enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 rather than 
rendering it practical and effective as required by the Convention (…). Accordingly, the Court takes 
the view that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a 
second “offence” in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same. 
(…) The Court's inquiry should therefore focus on those facts which constitute a set of concrete factual 
circumstances involving the same defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the 
existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal 
proceedings.”24 
In keeping with the case law of the ECJ on Article 54 CISA, and notwithstanding the differences in 
wording between Article 4P7 ECHR and Article 54 CISA, the Grand Chamber therefore adopted a 
broad, objective approach to the interpretation of the element of idem. The judgment strives to 
harmonize the various approaches to the interpretation of idem, rejecting the differences in wording 
between the various provisions as a justification for a more restrictive interpretation in the light of the 
need to arrive at an interpretation of the ne bis in idem rule which offers a high level of protection for 
the subject. Although the Grand Chamber has thus aligned its interpretation of idem with the case law 
on Article 54 CISA, the approach taken by it in doing so is therefore quite different from that taken by 
the CJEU, and reveals a more constitutional approach to the realization of the ne bis in idem principle 
on the European level. Ironically, it could therefore be said that the judgment precisely highlights the 
different perspectives of the CJEU and the ECtHR on this point.  
VII. Findings 
In this paper two perspectives on the role and function of the ne bis in idem principle in European law, 
the extradition paradigm and the constitutional paradigm, have been presented. Under the 
constitutional paradigm, the ne bis in idem principle is primarily seen as forming part of an emerging 
European constitutional order of fundamental rights, whereas under the extradition paradigm, the 
principle mainly forms the logical, functional consequence of closer cooperation between European 
States, along the lines of ne bis in idem rules in extradition laws which, due to their function, can 
sometimes differ somewhat from constitutional versions of the same rule. The extradition paradigm 
applies in particular in the context of the CISA which is closely linked to extradition and other forms 
of enforcement cooperation, and this is to a certain extent, taking into consideration the special nature 
of enhanced cooperation in criminal matters in the context of mutual recognition, reflected by the 
approach taken by the Court in the interpretation of 54 CISA. In the context of enhanced cooperation 
which amongst other things aims to do away with cumbersome and time-consuming extradition 
procedures between the Member States, the need for a clear and straight-forward ne bis in idem 
principle which applies across the board is evident. The constitutional paradigm however presents 
different challenges. Under the constitutional paradigm need the various ne bis in idem provisions in 
existence are taken as different expressions of a single fundamental legal principle to be further 
refined through case law. The emphasis is therefore on the need for uniformity and coherence in their 
realization. By their nature, both Articles 4P7 ECHR and 50 of the Charter belong in this category, and 
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this is reflected in the case law of the ECtHR. Although the Grand Chamber has brought its 
interpretation of the element of idem in line with the case law on Article 54 CISA, it can therefore be 
said that the Zolotukhin judgment precisely highlights the different perspectives of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR to the realization of the ne bis in idem rule on the European level.  
 
  
 
